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ABSTRACT 
Analyses of Power System Vulnerability  
and Total Transfer Capability. (December 2005) 
Xingbin Yu, B.S., Shanghai Jiao Tong University; 
M.S., Shanghai Jiao Tong University  
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Chanan Singh 
                                                       
Modern power systems are now stepping into the post-restructuring era, in which utility 
industries as well as ISOs (Independent System Operators) are involved. Attention needs to 
be paid to the reliability study of power systems by both the utility companies and the ISOs. 
An uninterrupted and high quality power is required for the sustainable development of a 
technological society. Power system blackouts generally result from cascading outages. 
Protection system hidden failures remain dormant when everything is normal and are 
exposed as a result of other system disturbances. This dissertation provides new methods 
for power system vulnerability analysis including protection failures. Both adequacy and 
security aspects are included.  
 
The power system vulnerability analysis covers the following issues: 1) Protection system 
failure analysis and modeling based on protection failure features; 2) New methodology for 
reliability evaluation to incorporate protection system failure modes; and, 3) Application of 
variance reduction techniques and evaluation. A new model of current-carrying component 
paired with its associated protection system has been proposed. The model differentiates 
two protection failure modes, and it is the foundation of the proposed research. Detailed 
stochastic features of system contingencies and corresponding responses are considered. 
Both adequacy and security reliability indices are computed. Moreover, a new reliability 
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index ISV (Integrated System Vulnerability) is introduced to represent the integrated 
reliability performance with consideration of protection system failures. According to these 
indices, we can locate the weakest point or link in a power system. The whole analysis 
procedure is based on a non-sequential Monte Carlo simulation method. In reliability 
analysis, especially with Monte Carlo simulation, computation time is a function not only 
of a large number of simulations, but also time-consuming system state evaluation, such as 
OPF (Optimal Power Flow) and stability assessment. Theoretical and practical analysis is 
conducted for the application of variance reduction techniques. 
 
The dissertation also proposes a comprehensive approach for a TTC (Total Transfer 
Capability) calculation with consideration of thermal, voltage and transient stability limits. 
Both steady state and dynamic security assessments are included in the process of obtaining 
total transfer capability. Particularly, the effect of FACTS (Flexible AC Transmission 
Systems) devices on TTC is examined. FACTS devices have been shown to have both 
positive and negative effects on system stability depending on their location. Furthermore, 
this dissertation proposes a probabilistic method which gives a new framework for 
analyzing total transfer capability with actual operational conditions.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Modern power systems are now stepping into the post-restructuring era, in which utility 
industries as well as ISOs are involved. It is understood that attention needs to be paid to 
the reliability of power systems both by the utility companies and the ISOs. Reliability 
analysis is an important part of power systems. An uninterrupted and high quality power 
is required for the sustainable development of a technological society. The reliability of 
composite power systems consists of two basic aspects, adequacy and security 
[1][2][3][4]. Adequacy is mainly concerned with the ability of the electric systems to 
supply the aggregate electrical demand and energy requirements of customers at all 
times taking into account scheduled and reasonably expected unscheduled outages of 
system elements. Security deals with the ability of the system to withstand sudden 
disturbances such as short circuits or unanticipated loss of system element [1]. 
 
Protective relaying is an important branch of electric power engineering concerned with 
the principles of design and operation of equipment which detect abnormal power 
system conditions, and initiate action as quickly as possible in order to isolate the faulted 
component and return the rest of the system to the normal condition. The primary 
purpose of protection system consists of correct diagnosis of trouble, quickness of 
response, and minimum disturbance to the power system. Due to the requirement of 
quick response, human intervention in the protection system operation is not possible. 
System protection has evolved, over the years, from relatively primitive devices with 
limited capacity, to complex systems that involve extensive hardware. The modern 
protective systems are more selective in their detection and operation, and often require 
greater analytical effort in their application [5]. We must further examine the possibility 
…  
 
This dissertation follows the style and format of IEEE Transactions on Power Systems.
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that protective relaying equipment itself may fail to operate correctly. It should be clear that 
extensive and sophisticated equipments and schemes are needed to accomplish these tasks. 
 
In most reliability analysis, protection systems are assumed to be perfectly reliable. 
However, protection system itself is a complicated system comprising of a number of 
components, each of which has probability of failure. During the development of the 
modern power systems, protection system dependability has taken priority over global 
system security. While reinforcing the protection complexity to guarantee the system 
dependability, the risk of incorrect operation of protection system increases as well. There 
is more and more evidence that protection systems play a role in the origin and propagation 
of major power system disturbances. Studies show that protective relays are involved in 
about 75 percent of major disturbances. Power system blackouts generally result from 
cascading outages. Protection system hidden failures, which remain dormant when 
everything is normal and are exposed as a result of other system disturbances [6], are the 
main cause of cascading outages. Admittedly, large-scale power system blackout is a rare 
event. However, when it occurs, the impact on the system is catastrophic [7]. Though 
considerable progress has been made in power system reliability modeling and 
computational methods, not much effort has been spent on the study of the cascading 
events resulting from protection system malfunction. It is only recently that serious efforts 
were initiated to study the effect of protection system on power system reliability. 
 
Some studies have been made on the origin and development of cascading outages, their 
impact and preventive action [7][8][9][10]. Most of the work was based on adequacy 
reliability analysis without considering the transient behavior of cascading outages. As a 
matter of fact, transient impact might interact with particular protection and control 
mechanisms in such a way that could cause or worsen cascading outages. Furthermore, 
stability is an important index that represents the system tolerance to contingencies.   
Therefore it is necessary to develop an integrated reliability study methodology concerning 
the protection system failures. 
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Total Transfer Capability (TTC) is another important topic in terms of planning, dispatch 
and control in system operation. In deregulated power system, TTC is the transmission 
limit for reserving and scheduling energy transactions in competitive electric markets. 
Accurate evaluation of TTC is essential to maximize utilization of existing transmission 
grids while maintaining system security. The TTC is a function of thermal, voltage and 
transient stability limits of the system. The previous work on calculating TTC considers 
only the first two constraints, i.e. thermal limit and voltage magnitude limit. The results 
without considering transient stability limit are prone to be somewhat optimistic and could 
not represent the actual system performance. Following those values in operation may lead 
to system instability in case of contingencies. 
 
1.2 Research Objectives 
The proposed research is focused on reliability analysis considering protection failures and 
calculation of transfer capability including stability. Both adequacy and security aspects are 
included. Following objectives are expected to be achieved. 
 
1.2.1 Protection System Failure Analysis and Modeling 
Based on protection failure features, a new model of current-carrying component paired 
with its associated protection system is established. This model differentiates 2 protection 
failure modes. This model is the foundation of the proposed research. Based on this model, 
we can obtain protection system failure probability with regard to its operation and 
inspection.  
 
A new methodology for reliability evaluation to incorporate protection system failure 
modes is proposed. The cascading outage procedure is simulated including the effect of 
protection system hidden failures. In the process of cascading outages, hidden failure 
probability varies depending on system fault and operating condition. Detailed stochastic 
features of system contingencies and corresponding responses are considered. Both 
adequacy and security reliability indices are computed. Moreover, a new reliability index 
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IOV is introduced to represent the integrated reliability performance with consideration of 
protection system failures. According to these indices, we can locate weakest point or link 
in a power system. The whole analysis procedure is based on non-sequential Monte Carlo 
simulation method. 
 
1.2.2 Variance Reduction Technique Application and Evaluation 
Protection failures are rare events in a power system. Some variance reduction technologies 
could be applied to reduce simulation time. The candidate technologies include dagger, 
importance sampling, etc. In reliability analysis, especially with Monte Carlo simulation, 
computation time is a function not only of often large number of simulations, but also of 
time consuming system state evaluation, such as OPF and stability assessment. Theoretical 
and practical analysis will be conducted for the application of variance reduction 
techniques. 
 
1.2.3 Total Transfer Capability Analysis 
Total Transfer Capability (TTC) is defined as the amount of electric power that can be 
transferred over the interconnected transmission network in a reliable manner while 
meeting all of a specific set of defined pre- and post-contingency system conditions. TTC 
may be limited by the physical and electrical characteristics of the systems including 
thermal, voltage, and stability limits. The calculation of TTC must incorporate all three 
constraints – thermal, voltage, and security. In this dissertation, security analysis is 
emphasized in TTC calculation since it has been rarely considered in previous studies. It is 
well known that Flexible AC Transmission System (FACTS) technology can control 
voltage magnitude, phase angle and circuit reactance, so it can redistribute the load flow 
and regulate bus voltage. One objective of this research is to investigate the impacts of the 
two most popularly used FACTS devices – Thyristor Controlled Series Compensator 
(TCSC) and Static Var Compensator (SVC) on TTC. Because of the essentially stochastic 
nature of power system behavior, it is very important to calculate ATC in a probabilistic 
framework. The third objective of this research is to develop methodology to compute and 
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analyze probabilistic TTC. In order to provide more realistic and complete information to 
various market participants, the statistical analysis and risk assessment associated with 
TTC are proposed. Probabilistic TTC methodology is expected to yield more realistic 
results. 
 
1.3 Organization of Dissertation 
Section II provides the literature review of techniques for power system reliability 
evaluations. The review includes power system reliability theory, protection system history 
and trend, blackouts and their causes and precautions. Total Transfer Capability analysis is 
also discussed. Section III describes component-protection system model and introduces 
hidden failure modes and mathematical models for adequacy and security analysis. Section 
IV proposes the methodology formulation of Monte Carlo simulation. Both adequacy and 
security analyses are implemented. Numerical simulations are included to demonstrate the 
application of the proposed methodology. Section V introduces two innovative approaches 
for power system reliability simulation: Importance Sampling Monte Carlo Simulation (IS-
MCS) and integration of Self-Organizing Map and Importance Sampling Monte Carlo 
Simulation (SOM-IS-MCS) methods. The concepts and applications of both approaches are 
introduced and evaluated. Case studies with adequacy and security analyses are performed. 
Section VI analyzes the effect of FACTS devices on TTC with security constraints and 
deals with probabilistic TTC calculation with consideration of security constraints. 
Numerical case studies are conducted and practical applications are evaluated. Section VII 
summarizes the research contribution and suggests the future work. 
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II. REVIEW 
 
2.1 Power System Reliability Considerations 
The primary role of a power system is to provide reliable and continuous electrical energy 
to satisfy system load. Power system reliability, in a broad sense, can be defined as the 
ability of the system to provide an adequate supply of electric power with satisfactory 
quality. Power systems have three main components: generation, transmission and 
distribution systems. The generation systems generate electricity and transmission systems 
deliver the generated electricity to distribution systems for supplying load. The generation 
systems together with transmission systems are usually called the composite system or the 
bulk power system.  
 
The reliability of a composite power system is comprised of both adequacy and security 
assessments [11-13]. Adequacy assessment relates to the ability of the system to supply 
energy requirements of customers in a satisfactory manner. Since adequacy assessment 
deals with static condition, it does not include the evaluation of the system response to 
transient disturbances. Security assessment deals with the ability of the electric systems to 
survive sudden disturbances such as electric short circuits or unanticipated loss of system 
elements. This includes the response of the system caused by the loss of generations and 
transmission lines.  
 
The typical indices used in power system reliability evaluation are the following 
 
Loss of Load probability (LOLP) is the probability that some portion of load demand 
may not be satisfied by the available generating capacity under the specified operating 
conditions and policies. LOLP is currently the most widely used reliability index.  
 
Daily Loss of Load Expectation (LOLE) is the expected period of time during a given 
period, in which the daily peak load is expected to exceed the available generating 
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capacity. The hourly LOLE in h/y can be obtained by multiplying the LOLP by 8760 
hours. LOLP and LOLE are often used interchangeably.  
 
Loss of Load Frequency (LOLF) is the expected number of occurrence during a given 
period of time that the system may fail to meet its load demand. 
 
Expected Unserved Energy (EUE) is the expected amount of energy during a given 
period of time that the system may be unable to supply to the consumers due to the loss 
of generation or load uncertainty. Typical unit is MWh/year. 
 
Shrinking transmission margins for reliability makes the preservation of system reliability a 
harder job than it used to be. The system is being operated closer to the edge of reliability 
that it was just a few years ago. Table 2.1 represents some of the changed conditions that 
make the reliability situation more challenging [14]. 
 
Table 2.1 Changing Conditions That Affect System Reliability 
Previous Conditions Emerging Conditions 
Fewer, relatively large resources Smaller, more numerous resources 
Long-term, firm contracts Contracts shorter in duration 
More non-firm transactions, fewer long-
term firm transactions 
Bulk power transactions relatively stable 
and predictable 
Bulk power transactions relatively variable 
and less predictable 
Assessment of system reliability made from 
stable base 
(narrower, more predictable range of 
potential operating states) 
Assessment of system reliability made from 
variable base  
(wider, less predictable range of potential 
operating states) 
Limited and knowledgeable set of utility 
players 
More players making more transactions, 
some with less interconnected operation 
experience; increasing with retail access 
Unused transmission capacity and high 
security margins 
High transmission utilization and operation 
closer to security limits 
Limited competition, little incentive for 
reducing reliability investments 
Utilities less willing to make investments in 
transmission reliability that do not increase 
revenues 
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Table 2.1 (Continued) 
Previous Conditions Emerging Conditions 
Market rules and reliability rules developed 
together 
Market rules undergoing transition, 
reliability rules developed separately 
Limiting wheeling More system throughput 
 
 
2.2 Protection System History and Trend 
Protection system plays an important role in power system operation in terms of safety and 
security. During the development of modern power systems, protection system 
dependability (the ability to function correctly when required) has taken priority over 
consideration of global system security (the ability to refrain from unnecessary operations). 
While reinforcing the protection systems to guarantee system dependability, the probability 
of their incorrect operation may increase as a result of higher complexity. It has been 
observed that protection system hidden failures commonly lead to multiple or cascading 
outages, which consequently can cause large-scale power system blackouts. A study by 
NERC (North American Electric Reliability Council) shows that protective relays are 
involved in about 75 percent of major disturbances [15]. There have been several large-
scale cascading failures in recent times effecting large populations of customers in the 
Western United States. All of these blackouts are related to protection system hidden 
failures, which remain dormant when everything is normal and manifest as a result of other 
system disturbances [6]. There are two major failure modes in protection system: “failure 
to operate” and “undesired tripping” [16]. The former means that when a fault occurs in a 
power system, the protection system fails to clear the fault. The latter refers to either 
spontaneous operation in the absence of a fault or trip for faults outside the protection zone. 
Large-scale power system blackout is a rare event. However, when it occurs, the impact on 
the system is catastrophic [7]. Therefore, study of the origin and propagation of cascading 
outages, their impact and preventive actions are becoming more and more imperative. 
 
Many studies have been conducted regarding hidden failures in protective relays and their 
impact on power system reliability [7][8][9][10][16][17]. Some of this work has proposed 
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methods for system vulnerability analysis. However, all of the work was mainly focused on 
adequacy analysis with the assumption that during cascading outages, system transits from 
one steady state to another. As a matter of fact, transient impact might interact with 
protection and control mechanisms in a way that could cause or worsen the impact of 
cascading outages. Furthermore, stability is a critical index that represents the system 
tolerance to contingencies. Vulnerability analysis ignoring the transient processes cannot 
represent the system behavior accurately and therefore the corresponding results may not 
give us the appropriate information. It is necessary to incorporate dynamic reliability 
analysis in a realistic vulnerability study as well. In this paper, while considering protection 
system failures, we conduct vulnerability research with consideration of both adequacy and 
security aspects, and provide a more realistic approach as applied to the power systems. 
  
Protection systems are complicated in terms of principle, function, setting, operation, and 
maintenance. We use a simple example (Figures 2.1 & 2.2) to illustrate protection system 
failure features [5].  
 
 
Figure 2.1 Transmission Line Protections with Redundant Components 
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Figure 2.2 Fault Tree for One of the Protective System of Figure 2.1 
 
As an example of fault tree construction, Figure 2.2 shows a fault tree for failure of the 
protective system shown in Figure 2.1. Almost the entire fault tree is constructed of OR 
gates, which indicates that there are many different items that can cause the failure of a 
protective system. The only requirement for the AND gate is in connection with the relays 
themselves, which are fully redundant. The nature of this type of failure may be different 
for breakers of different designs. 
 
2.3 Blackouts, Causes and Precautions 
Major blackouts are rare, and no two blackout scenarios are the same. The initiating events 
will vary, including human actions or inactions, system topology, and load/generation 
balances. Other factors that will vary include the distance between generating stations and 
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major load centers, voltage profiles across the grid, and the types and settings of protective 
relays in use. 
 
Some wide-area blackouts start with short circuits (faults) on several transmission lines in 
short succession – sometimes resulting from natural causes such as lightening or wind or, 
as on August 14, 2003, resulting from inadequate tree management on right-of-way areas 
[14]. A fault causes a high current and low voltage on the line containing the fault. A 
protective relay for that line detects the high current and low voltage and quickly trips the 
circuit breakers to isolate that line from the rest of the power system. 
 
A cascade is a dynamic phonemic phenomenon that cannot be stopped by human 
intervention once started. It occurs when there is a sequential tripping of numerous 
transmission lines and generators in a widening geographic area. A cascade can be 
triggered by just a few initiating events. Power swings and voltage fluctuations caused by 
these initial events can cause other lines to detect high currents and low voltages that 
appear to be faults, even if faults do not actually exist on those other lines. Generators are 
tripped off during a cascade to protect them from severe power and voltage swings. 
Protective relay systems work well to isolate them from the system under normal and 
abnormal system conditions.  
 
But when power system operating and design criteria are violated because several outages 
occur simultaneously, commonly used protective relays that measure low voltage and high 
current cannot distinguish between the currents and voltages seen in a system cascade from 
those caused by a fault. This leads to more and more lines and generators being tripped, 
widening the blackout area [14].  
 
System-wide disturbances that effect many customers across a broad geographic area are 
rare, but they occur more frequently than a normal distribution of probabilities would 
predict. North American power system outages between 1984 and 1997 are shown in 
 12
Figure 2.3 by the number of customers affected and the rate of occurrence. In Figure 2.3, 
the circles represent individual outages in North America between 1984 and 1997, plotted 
against the frequency of outages of equal or greater size over that period. (Source: Adapted 
from John Doyle, California Institute of Technology, “Complexity and Robustness,” 1999. 
Data: NERC). While some of these were widespread wealth-related events, some were 
cascading events that, in retrospect, were preventable. Electric power systems are fairly 
robust and are capable of withstanding one or more contingency events, but they are fragile 
with respect to multiple contingency events unless the systems are readjusted between 
contingencies. With the shrinking margin in the current transmission system, it is likely to 
be more vulnerable to cascading outages than it was in the past, unless effective 
countermeasures are taken [14]. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 North American Power System Outages, 1984-1997 
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Some representative catastrophic events are listed below. 
 
2.3.1 November 9, 1965: Northeast Blackout 
This disturbance resulted in the loss of over 20,000MW of load and affected 30 million 
people. Virtually all of New York, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, small 
segments of northern Pennsylvania and northeastern New Jersey, and substantial areas of 
Ontario, Canada, were affected. Outages lasted for up to 13 hours. This event resulted in 
the formation of the North American Electric Reliability Council in 1968. A backup 
protective relay operated to open one of five 230-kV lines taking power north from a 
generating plant in Ontario to the Toronto area. When the flows redistributed 
instantaneously on the remaining four lines, they tripped out successively in a total of 2.5 
seconds. The resultant power swings resulted in a cascading outage that blacked out much 
of the Northeast. 
 
The major causal factors were as follows: 
• Operation of a backup protective relay took a 230-kV line out of service when the 
loading on the line exceeded the 375-MW relay setting. 
• Operating personnel were not aware of the operating set point of this relay. Another 
230-kV line opened by an over current relay action, and several 115- and 230-kV 
lines opened by protective relay action. 
• Two key 345-kV east-west (Rochester-Syracuse) lines opened due to instability, 
and several lower voltage lines tripped open. 
• Five of 16 generators at the St. Lawrence (Massena) plant tripped automatically in 
accordance with predetermined operating procedures. 
• Following additional line tripouts, 10 generating units at Beck were automatically 
shut down by low governor oil pressure, and 5 pumping generators were tripped off 
by over speed governor control. 
• Several other lines then tripped out on under-frequency relay action. 
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2.3.2 July 13, 1977: New York City Blackout 
This disturbance resulted in the loss of 6,000 MW of load and affected 9 million people in 
New York City. Outages lasted for up to 26 hours. A series of events triggering the 
separation of the Consolidated Edison system from neighboring systems and its subsequent 
collapse began when two 345-KV lines on a common tower in Northern Westchester were 
struck by lightning and tripped out. Over the next hour, despite Consolidated Edison 
dispatcher actions, the system electrically separated from surrounding systems and 
collapsed. With the loss of imports, generation in New York City was not sufficient to 
serve the load in the city. 
 
Major causal factors were: 
• Two 345-kV lines connecting Buchanan South to Millwood West experienced a 
phase B to ground fault caused by a lightning strike. 
• Circuit breaker operations at the Buchanan South ring bus isolated the Indian Point 
No. 3 generating unit from any load, and the unit tripped for a rejection of 883 MW 
of load. 
• Loss of the ring bus isolated the 345-kV tie to Laden Town, which had been 
importing 427 MW, making the cumulative resources lost 1,320 MW. 
• 18.5 minutes after the first incident, an additional lightening strike caused the loss 
of two 345-kV lines, which connect Sprain Brook to Buchanan North and Sprain 
Brook to Millwood West. These two 345-kV lines share common towers between 
Millwood West and Sprain Brook. One line (Sprain Brook to Millwood West) 
automatically reclosed and was restored to service in about 2 seconds. The failure 
of the other line to reclose isolated the last Consolidated Edison interconnection to 
the Northwest. 
• The resulting surge of power from the Northwest caused the loss of the Pleasant 
Valley to Millwood West line by relay action. 
• 23 minuets later, the Leeds to Pleasant Valley 345-kV line sagged into a tree due to 
overload and tripped out. 
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• Within a minute, the 345 kV to 138 kV transformer at Pleasant Valley overloaded 
and tripped off, leaving Consolidated Edison with only three remaining 
interconnections. 
• Within 3 minutes, the Long Island Lighting Co. system operator, on concurrent of 
the pool dispatcher, manually opened the Jamaica to Valley Stream tie. 
• The two remaining external 138-kV ties to Consolidated Edison tripped on overload, 
isolating the Consolidated Edison system. 
• Insufficient generation in the isolated system caused the Consolidated Edison island 
to collapse. 
 
2.3.3 December 14, 1994: West Coast Blackout 
At 1:25 A.M. on December 14, 1994, electric power flowed much heavier than normal 
from southern California to northern California and from northern California to the 
Northwest. A single phase-to-ground fault on a 345-kV line at the three-terminal substation 
Midpoint-Borah in Idaho caused the inadvertent tripping of an additional 345-kV line in the 
same station. Due to the substation configuration, the remaining line became open-ended, 
which is equivalent to being off-line. Overload and under voltage condition for some lines 
developed within the system due to the weakened network. The lines tripped one after 
another in a domino effect style, which led to the formation of four separate islands, 5,020 
MW power was lost and 1,500,000 customers affected in this single phase-to-ground fault 
initiated event [18].  
 
2.3.4 July 2-3, 1996: West Coast Blackout 
This disturbance resulted in the loss of 11,850 MW of load and affected 2 million people in 
the West. Customers were affected in Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, and 
Wyoming in the United States; Alberta and British Columbia in Canada; and Baja 
California Norte in Mexico. Outages lasted from a few minutes to several hours.  
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The Outage began when a 345-kV transmission line in Idaho sagged into a tree and tripped 
out. A protective relay on a parallel transmission line also detected the fault and incorrectly 
tripped a second line. An almost simultaneous loss of these lines greatly reduced the ability 
of the system to transmit power from the nearby Jim Bridge plant. Other relays tripped two 
of the four generating units at that plant. With the loss of those two units, frequency in the 
entire Western Interconnection began to decline, and voltage began to collapse in the Boise 
and Idaho area, affecting the California-Oregon AC inter tie transfer limit. 
For 23 seconds the system remained in precarious balance, until the Mill Creek to Antelope 
230-kV line between Montana and Idaho tripped by zone 3 relay, depressing voltage at 
Summer Lake Substation and causing the inter tie to slip out of synchronism. Remedial 
action relays separated the system into five pre-engineered islands designed to minimize 
customer outrages and restoration times. Similar conditions and initiating factors were 
present on July 3; however, as voltage began to collapse in the Boise area, the operator 
shed load manually and contained the disturbance. 
 
2.3.5 August 10, 1996: West Coast Blackout 
This disturbance resulted in the loss of over 28,000 MW of load and affected 7.5 million 
people in the West. Customers were affected in Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, 
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, 
Washington, and Wyoming in the United States; Alberta and British Columbia in Canada; 
and Baja California Norte in Mexico. Outages lasted from a few minutes to as long as nine 
hours. 
 
Triggered by several major transmission line outages, the loss of generation from McNary 
Dam, and resulting system oscillations, the Western Interconnection separated into four 
electrical islands, with significant loss of load and generation. Prior to the disturbance, the 
transmission system from Canada south through the Northwest into California was heavily 
loaded with north-to-south power transfers. These flows were due to high Southwest 
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demand caused by hot weather, combined with excellent hydroelectric conditions in 
Canada and the Northwest. 
 
Very high temperatures in the Northwest caused two lightly loaded transmission lines to 
sag into untrimmed trees and trip out. A third heavily loaded line also sagged into a tree. Its 
outage led to the overload and loss of additional transmission lines. General voltage decline 
in the Northwest and the loss of Mcnary generation due to incorrectly applied relays caused 
power oscillations on the California to Oregon AC inter tie. The inter tie’s protective relays 
tripped these facilities out and caused the Western Interconnection to separate into four 
islands. Following the loss of the first two lightly loaded lines, operators were unaware that 
the system was in an insecure state over the next hour, because new operating studies had 
not been performed to identify needed system adjustments. 
 
2.3.6 August 14, 2003: US Midwest and Northeast/Canada 
Before the blackout, a sequence of line trappings in northeast Ohio after 15:05 EDT caused 
heavily loadings on a number of transmission lines. The weakened system quickly started a 
cascading blackout at 16:05:57 (East Standard Time) after the Sammis-Star 345-kV relayed. 
In less than ten minutes, more than 508 generating units at 265 power plants were lost. The 
northern part of the whole eastern interconnection was broken apart into five islands. The 
blackout affected about 50 million people and caused the loss of 61,800 MW of electric 
load in the state of Ohio, Michigan, Pennsylvania, New York, Vermont, Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, New Jersey and the Canadian province of Ontario [14]. 
 
2.4 Total Transfer Capability (TTC) 
2.4.1 Problem Definition 
Total Transfer Capability (TTC) is defined as the amount of electric power that can be 
transferred over the interconnected transmission network in a reliable manner while 
meeting all of a specific set of defined pre- and post-contingency system conditions. TTC 
may be limited by the physical and electrical characteristics of the systems including 
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thermal, voltage, and stability limits. Total Transfer Capability is an important indicator of 
how much power can be transferred between two buses in the power system without 
compromising the system security [19][20]. The accurate TTC provides critical information 
for power system planners, operators and marketers. Planners need to know where the 
system bottlenecks are. Operators need to identify transmission congestions based on TTC, 
and marketers need to know if the transaction along certain route in the grid is feasible or 
not. The accurate TTC calculation is needed to ensure that power system can operate 
without reliability risks. Excessive conservative TTC, of course, may limit the power 
transfer unnecessarily and make the system operate inefficiently. In other words, TTC is 
the largest value of power transfer that causes no limit violations, with or without a 
contingency. The objective is to determine the maximum real power transfers from sending 
areas to receiving area. 
 
Mathematically the TTC calculation procedure can be simplified as following:  
• establish a base case without any violations;  
• Define a transfer, which includes a power source and sink;  
• Increase power input in the source and load in the sink until one of the limit is 
violated.  
Find out the maximum delivered power from source to sink though the transmission 
network. 
 
2.4.2 Existing Methods of TTC Calculation 
2.4.2.1 Continuation Power Flow Approach 
Continuation power flow method can be used to calculate TTC [21][22][23]. Starting from 
a solved base case, this method obtains a series of power flow solutions by increasing the 
transfer parameter without singularity of the Jacobian by way of a prediction-correction 
scheme. The amount of the transfer is a scalar parameter in the problem model. 
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2.4.2.2 Optimal Power Flow Approach 
The application of Optimal Power Flow (OPF) in power system congestion management 
has been studied by some researchers [24][25][26][27]. In the mean time, TTC calculation 
by OPF approach has been proposed since 1999[28][29][30]. The basic concept of OPF 
approach is formulating the TTC calculation as an optimization problem, with equity 
constraints of power flow, inequality constraints from basic operation and equipment limits 
to more detailed approximation of transient stability security requirements. The objective 
function, obviously, is the maximum power flow on the specified transmission route. 
 
2.4.2.3 Repeated Power Flow Approach 
Repeated power flow approach starts from a base case, and repeatedly solves the power 
flow equations each time increasing the power transfer by a small increment until an 
operation limit is reached [31]. The advantage of this approach is its simple implementation 
and the ease to take security constraints into consideration. In this dissertation, this method 
is adopted to solve TTC problem. 
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III. RELIABILITY MODEL*
 
Power system blackouts result from cascading outages. Protection system failures are the 
main cause of cascading outages. To facilitate reliability analysis with consideration of 
protection system failures, in this section, component-protection system model, together 
with hidden failure modes and mathematical formulation are proposed. Based on these 
models, adequacy and security analysis can be conducted successfully. 
  
3.1 Introduction 
Protection system plays an important role in power system operation in terms of safety and 
security. During the development of modern power systems, protection system 
dependability (the ability to function correctly when required) has taken priority over 
consideration of global system security (the ability to refrain from unnecessary operations). 
While reinforcing the protection systems to guarantee system dependability, the probability 
of their incorrect operation may increase as a result of higher complexity. It has been 
observed that protection system hidden failures commonly lead to multiple or cascading 
outages, which consequently can cause large-scale power system blackouts. A study by 
NERC (North American Electric Reliability Council) shows that protective relays are 
involved in about 75 percent of major disturbances [14]. There have been several large-
scale cascading failures in recent times affecting large populations of customers in the 
Western United States. All of these blackouts are related to protection system hidden 
failures, which remain dormant when everything is normal and manifest as a result of other 
system disturbances [6]. Large-scale power system blackout is a rare event. However, when 
it occurs, the impact on the system is catastrophic [7]. Therefore, study of the origin and 
propagation of cascading outages, their impact and preventive actions are becoming more 
and more imperative. 
 
                                                 
* Part of this section is reprinted with permission from “A Practical Approach for Integrated Power System 
Vulnerability Analysis with Protection Failures” by Xingbin Yu and Chanan Singh, 2004. IEEE Transactions 
on Power Systems, Volume: 19, Issue: 4, pp. 1811-1820. © 2004 by IEEE. 
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In conventional power system reliability analysis, following assumptions are normally 
made: 
• Protection system is 100% reliable 
• Circuit is treated as single element 
• Terminal station is considered as a single a busbar.  
 
Figure 3.1 shows the typical single busbar representation of a terminal station, which 
includes protection system. When simultaneous outages are studied, the term “common 
mode contingency” is usually used. Common mode contingency is an event having a single 
external cause with multiple failure effects which are not consequences of each other. The 
concept of station-originated outages is used to handle simultaneous outages for terminal 
stations. In Figure 3.1, for instance, the failure of breaker 2 can cause outage of both L2 
and L3.    
 
B1 B2 B3
 
Figure 3.1 Conventional Assumption of a Terminal Station 
 
Even if the probability of individual outage is high, the product can become quite small. 
The probability of a protection related outage resulting in a similar event can, however, be 
B6 B7
  B4 
B
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T1 T2 T3 
 G2  G3 
 G1  G2  G3 
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many times larger. Therefore, the effect of such outages on reliability indices can be 
significant as compared with second and higher order simultaneous independent outage.  
 
3.2 Protection Failure Modes and Cascading Outages 
Protection system has two major failure modes: “failure to operate” and “undesired 
tripping” [15]. The former means that when a fault occurs in a power system, the protection 
system fails to clear the fault. The latter refers to either spontaneous operation in the 
absence of a fault or trip for faults outside the protection zone. In practice, phenomenon of 
stuck breaker is included in “failure to operate” mode. 
  
A cascading outage refers to a series of trips initiated by one component failure in the 
system. When a fault occurs, the impact on the system such as over-current or voltage drop 
may cause some protection devices to operate incorrectly. Two types of protection system 
failures mentioned above are the major cause of cascading outages. Based on real life 
protection scenario, “failure to operate” will directly cause at least one bus isolation in the 
system. There are 2 types of “undesired tripping”, one is “spontaneous unwanted tripping” 
that occurs in the absence of a fault, and another is “tripping for faults outside the 
protection zone”. Since spontaneous unwanted tripping can be remedied immediately by 
auto-reclose and the system is designed to withstand the loss of any single element without 
a fault, this case does not have significant effect on the system reliability. Tripping for 
faults outside the protection zone is the main cause of the cascading outages. We will only 
focus on this kind of undesired trip in this research. 
 
3.3 Models and Assumptions 
3.3.1 Component-Protection Model 
There have been a number of models established to facilitate the reliability evaluation 
including protection system failures. The model of current-carrying component paired with 
its associated protection system proposed by Singh and Patton [15] [16] is effective for 
general reliability analysis. However, it does not differentiate protection failure modes. In 
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this dissertation, the model is expanded to include the failure modes of protection system as 
shown in Figure 3.2, where we have the following: 
 
State 1: the current-carrying component and the protection system are both good. 
State 2: the component is good but the protection is at risk for “undesired trip”. 
State 3: the component is good but the protection is exposed to “failure to operate”. 
State 4: the component is good and the protection system is being inspected. 
Stage 5: the component is failed while the protection system is still under “undesired trip” 
State 6: the component is failed but the protection system is good. 
State 7: the component is failed while the protection system has experienced “failure to 
operate”. 
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Figure 3.2 State Transition Diagram of a Component and Its Protection System 
 
The notations in Figure 3.2 are as below: 
µi  inspection rate of protection system.  
µI   repair rate of protection system. 
µ  repair rate of component. 
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λ  failure rate of component. 
λP1  failure rate of protection system to exposure to “undesired trip”.  
λP2  failure rate of protection system to state of “failure to operate”  
 
This model differentiates the two protection failure modes and represents them as two 
states: “undesired trip” and “failure to trip”. When a component is in these two states, its 
protection system is suffering from hidden failure and can cause malfunction. Different 
failure modes will lead to different responses to contingencies and therefore have different 
contributions to system vulnerability. We adopt this model to derive probability of each 
state as basic input for subsequent simulation. 
 
3.3.2 Protection System Failure Models 
The “failure to operate” may occur after the fault is initiated. When “failure to operate” 
happens, the faulted line will be isolated by backup protection. Normally we use the phrase 
“stuck breaker” to represent this case. “Failure to operate” phenomenon is not very 
complicated since it is only related to the protection device itself rather than system 
operating condition. The probability of “failure to operate” is the probability of state 3 in 
the component/protection model (Figure 3.2).  
 
The “undesired tripping” is more complicated since in this case the occurrence of cascading 
outages results not only from the existence of hidden protection failures, but is also related 
to system fault and operating conditions. “Failure to operate” and “undesired tripping” may 
occur simultaneously during the fault period. After the fault is cleared, “undesired tripping” 
will be the sole cause of cascading outages. In the following discussion we emphasize the 
“undesired tripping” properties. 
 
We use distance protection and overcurrent protection to reveal the protection hidden 
failures “during fault” and “post fault” periods respectively. Since distance protection zone 
3 and overcurrent protection overload  have the lowest faulty parameter setting values, they 
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are more sensitive to the fault and abnormal operating conditions, Therefore, distance 
protection zone 3 and overcurrent protection overload are used to represent protection 
hidden failure properties in the study. 
 
Reference [8] proposed a model of hidden failure probability of exposed line tripping as a 
function of impedance seen by the relay. In this paper, we adopt some simplification for the 
probability properties. For distance protection scheme, this property is shown in Figure 3.3 
that suits the situation during the fault period.  
 
 
Incorrect setting & miscalibration 
 
3*Z3Z3
Unrevealed failures in correctly set relay 
 
 
PZ 
 
 
 
 
 
 Z
 
 PZ:  Distance protection failure probability  
Z3:   Impedance zone 3 setting 
Z:  Impedance seen by relay 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Distance Protection Failure Probability of Exposed Line 
 
On the other hand, after the initial fault is cleared, power flow in the system would change 
due to the changing topology. This might lead to redistribution of load on certain lines, 
which are then at risk to trip subsequently [9]. To represent the post-fault situation, we 
introduce over-current protection failure probability property as shown in Figure 3.4.  
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Figure 3.4 Over-current Protection Failure Probability of Exposed Line 
 
In Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4, PZ and PI are the probability of state 2 in the 
component/protection model (Figure 3.2). PZ and PI are protection system failure properties 
that are used “during fault” period and “post-fault” period respectively. Although PZ and PI 
refer to different protection devices, they are similar in type (either electromechanical, 
static, or digital). For simplicity of calculations we use the same numerical values for PZ 
and PI. This is however not an inherent limitation and different values can be used if 
available. Nevertheless, during the simulation process, the probability of exposed line 
tripping incorrectly is not simply a fixed value. On the contrary, it is also dependent on the 
fault and operating conditions as shown in Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4. Each line may have a 
different probability of incorrect trip. 
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3.3.3 Mathematical Models 
3.3.3.1 Cascading Outages 
Traditional power system fault calculation is conducted in “during fault” period to figure 
out the outages in addition to the faulted line. Fault analysis here first calculates fault 
currents in all transmission lines and voltages in all buses. Based on these fault parameters 
the impedance seen by relay at each bus can be calculated. The impedance values then can 
be used as inputs of Figure 3.3 to determine the hidden failure probabilities “during fault” 
period. 
 
Similarly, in “post-fault” period, Newton-Raphson power flow method is used to examine 
further line outages due to overload. The current values are inputs of Figure 3.4 to 
determine the hidden failure probability in “post-fault” period. 
 
These two procedures control the process of cascading outages for both adequacy and 
security analysis.  
 
3.3.3.2 Adequacy Analysis 
An optimization procedure to determine the occurrence and the amount of load curtailment 
is formulated for adequacy assessment. The formulation is shown as below: 
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=
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maxmin gigigi PPP ≤≤  
maxmin gigigi QQQ ≤≤       i=1,…,ng 
 
dili PP ≤≤0  
dili QQ ≤≤0        i=1,…,nd 
 
maxmin iii UUU ≤≤       i=1,…,n 
2
max
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ijijij SQP ≤+        ij∈[1,…,nb] 
 
where  
n, ng , nd, nb:  the number of node, generator node, load node and branch; 
Pgi, Qgi:   the real and reactive output of the generator; 
      Pgimin, Pgimax:  the min/max real power of the generator; 
Qgimin, Qgimax:  the min/max reactive power of the generator; 
      Pli, Qli:   the load after rescheduling of generation; 
      Pdi, Qdi:   the actual demand; 
     Ui:    the voltage magnitude; 
     Uimin, Uimax: the voltage magnitude limits; 
     Pij, Qij:   the line flow; 
     Sijmax:   the line flow limit. 
 
3.3.3.3 Security Analysis 
We examine system transient stability for security analysis. Due to the shortcomings of the 
commonly used CCT (Critical Clearing Time) method for transient analysis including 
random fault location and auto-reclosing [32], we choose swing equation model to handle 
stability analysis directly. A typical swing-equation model includes second-order 
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differential equations associated with generator buses and algebraic equations for other 
buses. For the generator buses, we have equation (3.2): 
gimiiii PPDM −=+ δδ &&&          i=1,…,n      (3.2) 
 
where iδ   : the generator rotor angle. 
   : the mechanical power input miP
   : the electrical power output giP
     n   : the number of generators. 
     Mi   : the ith-generator’s inertia coefficient 
     Di    : the ith-generator’s damping coefficient 
 
Mechanical power Pmi  is equal to the pre-fault electrical power, which can be obtained by 
power flow calculation. Electric power output is given as (3.3): 
)cos(
1
jiij
n
j
ijjigi YVVP δδθ +−= ∑
=
    i=1,…,n   (3.3) 
where Yij  is the reduced bus admittance matrix. 
 
The transient stability criterion is that within a certain period after the occurrence of fault, 
the difference of any two rotor angles does not exceed the maximum secure relative swing 
angle, which is set as 180°. Since transient stability is only examined in a short time period 
after the occurrence of a fault, the assumption is made that the series of cascading outages 
occur within that short period. 
 
3.3.4 Stochastic Features 
To evaluate power system reliability, especially for security analysis, probabilistic factors 
must be taken into consideration [11]. There are many uncertainties in terms of system 
contingencies and corresponding responses. The following stochastic features are 
considered in our vulnerability evaluation. 
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• Type of fault: A variety of contingencies might happen in a power system. As for 
the vulnerability analysis, however, we assume all faults to be three-phase, either 
transient or permanent. This strategy will yield somewhat conservative results. 
• Location of fault: The fault probabilities of transmission lines are calculated from 
their forced outage data. On the particular faulted line, the fault location is assumed 
to follow uniform distribution model. 
• Fault clearing time: A normal probability distribution model is used to represent the 
fault clearing time.   
• Reclosing time: The probabilities associated with the auto-reclosing time are 
assumed to be normally distributed. 
• Fault duration: The distribution of fault duration is assumed Rayleigh. 
 
3.3.5 Assumptions 
Following assumptions are made in the vulnerability analysis.  
• “Failure to operate” and “undesired trip” of the protection system failure do not 
overlap. That means, these two protection system failure do not occur 
simultaneously.  
• Only first order initial contingencies are considered. 
• The protection system failure does not happen when the current carrying component 
is in failure state. 
• All failures are mutually independent. Failures of the protection system are 
independent from the failures of the components. 
• Generator mechanical power Pmi is constant during the transient procedure. 
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IV.  IMPLEMENTATION OF VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY*
 
In this section, detailed cascading outage sequences are described and analyzed. 
Comprehensive Monte Carlo simulation methodology is implemented to simulate 
cascading outages. Some crucial reliability indices are calculated. Integrated System 
Vulnerability (ISV), including both adequacy and security effects, is proposed to represent 
the integrated vulnerability of a power system. Numerical results of simulations are also 
included. 
 
4.1 Cascading Outage Sequences 
Due to the complicated stochastic features of cascading outages, we use a sample network 
(Figure 4.1) to describe the basic simulation principle. The event tree in Figure 4.2 just 
illustrates a certain possible cascading outage sequence, in which there are nine events 
listed. In real simulation, other cascading outage sequences might happen also. 
 
L1
3B3A
2B1B 2A1A
5B
5A
4B4A L2
L5
L4
L3
6A
6BL6
 
Figure 4.1 Sample Network. 
                                                 
* Part of this section is reprinted with permission from “A Practical Approach for Integrated Power System 
Vulnerability Analysis with Protection Failures” by Xingbin Yu and Chanan Singh, 2004 IEEE Transactions 
on Power Systems, Volume: 19, Issue: 4, pp. 1811-1820. © 2004 by IEEE. 
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Figure 4.2 Possible Event-tree for Cascading Outages. 
 
These nine possible events in Figure 4.2 are explained as below:  
1) A fault occurs on transmission line L1. All lines connected to the faulted line are 
exposed lines. So lines L2, L3, L4 and L5 are exposed lines and are at risk to 
misoperate. 
2) Breaker 1A and 1B trip, no hidden failure for protection system associated with line 
L1. Fault is cleared. 
3) Breaker 1A trips whereas 1B does not due to “failure to operate”, such as stuck 
breaker mode. 
4) Breaker 1A and 1B reclose successfully for temporary fault.  
5) Breaker 1A and 1B reclose unsuccessfully for permanent fault.  
6) Backup protection operates to trip breakers 2A and 3A. 
7) L1 back to service. Breaker 2A and 2B trip provided there is “undesired tripping” 
hidden failure exists on the protection system associated with line L2 
8) Breaker 1A and 1B trip again. Breaker 2A and 2B trip provided there is “undesired 
tripping” hidden failure exists on the protection system associated with line L2 
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9) Breaker 6A and 6B trip provided there is “undesired tripping” hidden failure  on the 
protection system associated with line L6 
 
Event tree in Figure 4.2 does not exhaust all possible event paths. In fact, it just presents an 
example to describe the sequence of cascading outages due to protection system failure. In 
Figure 4.2, events 6), 7), 8) and 9) indicate the cascading outages resulting from protection 
system hidden failures. In simulation, the series of outages would keep on extending in the 
inherent probabilistic manner until no more new outage occurs or certain criterion is 
reached. 
 
4.2 Process of Analysis 
4.2.1 During Fault 
Fault remains in the system and protection system takes action under fault condition. 
During the fault period, all neighboring components in the system are suffering from 
impact as well. This is the most dangerous period for the exposure of unrevealed failures. 
Therefore, fault analysis is conducted in this period till the fault is eventually cleared. The 
events in this period include events 1)~6) in Figure 4.2.   
 
4.2.2 Post-Fault 
After the fault is cleared, system enters after-fault period, in which transient phenomenon is 
still going on but no fault exists any longer. In this period, cascading outage probability is 
mainly associated with the exposed lines’ over-current resulting from network topology 
changes. Therefore we apply power flow analysis in this period to figure out following 
cascading events. 
 
4.3 Reliability and Vulnerability Indices 
4.3.1 Bus Isolation Probability (BIP) 
Bus isolation is a major disturbance to the power system. BIP shows the weakness of 
system in which a single component outage might result in bus isolation. 
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The mathematical description is as equation (4.1). 
 
∑=
i
i
N
I
BIP         (4.1) 
where i : an element of the set of simulations conducted. 
     Ii  : 1 if there is bus isolation in simulation i, otherwise it is 0. 
           N  : the total number of simulations. 
 
In simulation, “bus isolation” is the criterion to stop for a series of outages. This means that 
as the series of outages progress, it is stopped as soon as a bus is isolated. 
 
4.3.2 Loss of Load Probability (LOLP) 
LOLP is a typical reliability index indicating the likelihood that service to electricity 
customers will be curtailed. Normally, a power system can withstand one component 
outage without adequacy and security violation. Based on our assumptions, here the LOLP 
represents the load curtailment resulting from protection system failure. The series of 
outages is stopped as soon as loss of load occurs. 
 
LOLP is described mathematically in equation (4.2) 
∑=
i
i
N
LLOLP          (4.2) 
 
where i : an element of set of simulations conducted. 
           Li : 1 if there is load curtailment in simulation i, otherwise it is 0. 
  N  : the total number of simulations. 
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4.3.3 Expected Power Loss (EPL) 
EPL is the average load curtailment quantity of a power system. This index with units of 
“MW” can numerically show the impact of cascading outages on the system. There is no 
artificial stopping criterion for a series of outages being used for calculating this index. The 
series of outage will keep extending until no more new outages occur. 
 
∑=
i
i
N
CEPL         (4.3) 
where i : an element of set of completion of cascading outages. 
                     Ci : the load curtailment during simulation i. 
 N  : the total number of simulations. 
 
In the analysis of this dissertation, EPL indicates the impact of hidden failures on system 
reliability. It should be normalized to differentiate the effects on various power systems. 
The normalized EPL can be defined as nEPL in (4.4) 
 
SL
EPLnEPL =         (4.4) 
 
where SL is the total system load. 
 
4.3.4 Probability of Stability (POS) 
POS shows the likelihood of system stability. The aim of power system stability study is to 
check the system’s ability of maintaining synchronism under system contingencies. At the 
end of each cascading outage, security analysis is performed based on the series of outages 
just occurred to check if any generator in the system loses synchronization. The result of 
evaluation is recorded to facilitate the derivation of POS. Similarly, POS is defined as 
equation (4.5). 
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∑=
i
i
N
SPOS         (4.5) 
 
where   I : an element of set of simulations. 
              Si : 1 if the system is stable in simulation i, otherwise it is 0. 
              N : the total number of simulations. 
 
4.3.5 Integrated System Vulnerability (ISV) 
In a power system, each transmission line has different component failure phenomena, 
protective device hidden failure probability and protection system scheme. Because of 
these variations, BIP, LOLP, EPL or POS separately might locate different weak links for 
the same system. ISV, with effects of both adequacy and security performance, represents 
the integrated vulnerability of a particular system. After obtaining BIP, LOLP, nEPL and 
POS, we can calculate ISV by choosing proper weighting factors (4.6). 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )POSnEPLLOLPBIPISV −+++= 14321 αααα    (4.6) 
 
where α : the weighting factors. 
 
The selection of the weighting factors depends on the emphasis of the study and the 
specific requirements of the power systems. In this dissertation, we propose the set of 
weighting factors be 0.25, 0.10, 0.15 and 0.50 with the balanced importance of adequacy 
and security. Specifically, security factor is 0.50 and total adequacy factor is 0.50, in which 
three adequacy indices have shares of 0.25, 0.10 and 0.15 respectively.  
 
4.4 Simulation Algorithm  
The simulation consists of two procedures. The first one is analytical procedure generating 
protection system hidden failure probabilities and the second one is non-sequential Monte 
Carlo simulation calculating reliability indices. 
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4.4.1 Hidden Failure Probability Calculation 
In a power system, each transmission line has its own protection system, which has its own 
hidden failure probability as well. From Markov chain in Figure 3.2, based on known state 
transition rates, we can figure out the hidden failure probability of each protection system. 
  
First we form the transition rate matrix as (4.7) according to the Markov chain. Then the 
state probabilities can be calculated by solving the equations in (4.8) [13]. Particularly, 
probabilities of state 2 (“undesired trip”) and state 3 (“failure to operate”) are of our interest. 
The probability of “undesired trip” (PZ and PI) will be denoted to Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 
therefore the dynamic properties of hidden failure probability can be established. They will 
be used in the simulation in following section 4.4.2. 
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where p is a row vector whose ith element pi is the steady state probability of being in the ith 
state. 
 
4.4.2 Monte Carlo Simulation 
Non-sequential Monte Carlo simulation is used to calculate all reliability indices.  In 
essence, the non-sequential Monte Carlo simulation consists of sampling states 
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proportional to their probabilities of occurrence [13]. This is achieved by drawing a random 
number between 0 and 1 and then comparing it with the probability of occurrence of a state. 
If the random number is less than or equal to the probability of occurrence, then the state is 
considered as occurred and evaluation of this stage for adequacy and security is performed. 
This information is then translated into the estimation of indices using the equations 
outlined in Section 4.3. Monte Carlo simulation generally takes much longer time to 
converge than analytical reliability assessment methods. However, it can handle 
complicated problems in a more realistic manner.  
 
Our task comprises of both adequacy and security analysis. The basic methodology is 
explained as follows: 
  
1) Select a faulted line using the fault probabilities of transmission lines calculated from 
their forced outage data. 
2) List all exposed lines that are likely to mis-operate. 
3) Check if fault is cleared. If yes, compute the currents on the exposed lines by 
conducting power flow calculation. Go to step 8 
4) Compute the impedance seen by relays for the exposed lines by conducting fault 
calculation. 
5) Check if “failure to operate” occurs by comparing the random numbers generated and 
protection failure probabilities. If “failure to operate” occurs, auto-recloser will not be 
activated and backup protection will clear the fault therefore additional lines will be 
out. Update exposed line list. Go to step 7 
6) Return the faulted line into the system if auto-reclosing is successful.  
7) Figure out tripping probability for each exposed line during the fault as a function of 
the impedance seen by relays (Figure 3.2) computed  in step 4,  Go to step 9 
8) Figure out tripping probability for each exposed line after the fault as a function of 
current (Figure 3.3) computed in step 3.  
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9) Determine k (the number of lines that will trip) out of n (the total number of exposed 
lines) undesired trip by comparing the random numbers generated and the tripping 
probabilities derived in last step (either step 7 or step 8).  
10) Update the list of exposed lines based on newly tripped lines. 
11) If new lines trip, go to step 3. 
12) Record the cascading outages and  
a. For adequacy analysis, use OPF to determine the amount of load curtailment.  
b. For security analysis, use stability evaluation algorithm to check if the system is 
stable.  
13) Calculate reliability indices 
14) Check if either indices are converged or the maximum number of simulations is 
reached. If yes, stop. Otherwise go to step 1. 
 
Repeating the above simulation with randomly selected initial faulted lines will give us the 
system-wide indices. On the other hand, by specifying the initial faulted line during the 
simulation, we can get individual reliability indices so as to locate the weakest point in the 
system. Detailed Monte Carlo simulation flowchart is presented in Figure 4.3. 
 
4.5 Numerical Results of Simulation 
4.5.1 Test System and Data 
The 24-bus IEEE Reliability Test System (RTS) as Figure A.1 in Appendix A is used to 
demonstrate the results. 
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Figure 4.3 Flowchart for Calculating Reliability Indices 
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The basic data for the RTS system can be found in [33]. In addition, the transition rates of 
components and protection systems are listed in Table A.1 in Appendix A. Those transition 
rates are corresponding to the ones in Figure 3.2. According to the data, the hidden failure 
probability of each protection system can be calculated by (4.7) and (4.8) and the results 
are shown in the right-most column of Table A.1 in Appendix A. 
 
Some other important simulation parameters are summarized in Table A.2 in Appendix A. 
 
4.5.2 Simulation Process 
4.5.2.1 Adequacy Indices 
Figures 4.4 – 4.6 illustrate the Monte Carlo simulation process for calculating BIP, LOLP, 
and nEPL respectively. 
  
 
Figure 4.4 BIP by Monte Carlo Simulation 
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Figure 4.5 LOLP by Monte Carlo Simulation 
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Figure 4.6 nEPL by Monte Carlo Simulation 
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4.5.2.2 Security Index 
Stability evaluation is included in individual Monte Carlo simulation process. Two typical 
cases are selected and the corresponding stability evaluations are demonstrated as below: 
 
Case-1: Fault at 0.7 of line 11-14, fault cleared at 0.065sec, successful reclosing at 0.739sec, 
cascading outages: 
a) Line 9-11. 
b) Line 3-9 and 4-9. 
c) Line 1-3. 
 
The listed cascading outages are assumed to occur immediately after the successful 
reclosing. The evaluation result indicates the system is still stable after the cascading 
outages (Figure 4.7). 
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Figure 4.7 Case-1: Machine Phase Angle 
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Case-2:  Fault at 0.4 of line 8-9, fault cleared at 0.066sec, unsuccessful reclosing at 
0.698sec. The sequence of cascading outages is: 
a) Line 3-9 and 4-9. 
b) Line 2-4, 1-3, 9-11, and 9-12. 
c) Line 1-3, and 2-4. 
d) Line 1-2. 
 
The system is unstable with the series of cascading outages. Specifically, generator 2 loses 
synchronism from the others. The simulation result is shown in Figure 4.8. 
 
 
Figure 4.8 Case-2: Machine Phase Angle 
 
The Monte Carlo simulation process for calculating the Probability of Stability (POS) is 
illustrated in Figure 4.9. 
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Figure 4.9 POS by Monte Carlo simulation 
  
4.5.3 Numerical Results and Analysis 
System-wide reliability indices are listed in Table 4.1. The results represent the degree of 
vulnerability when a particular system suffers from cascading outages. 
 
Table 4.1 System-wide Simulation Results 
BIP 
(x10-2) 
LOLP 
(x10-2) 
nEPL 
(x10-2) 
POS 
ISV 
(x10-2) 
3.02 3.40 5.13 0.9633 2.76 
 
 
We also calculated the individual reliability indices with the specified faulted lines. The 
results are shown in Table 4.2. These indices help us to learn which part of the system is 
the weakest link according to our criteria.   
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Table 4.2 Individual Simulation Results 
Faulted 
Line 
BIP 
(x10-2) 
LOLP 
(x10-2) 
nEPL 
(x10-2) POS 
ISV 
(X10-2) 
1-2 2.68 2.29 9.03 0.9641 2.74 
1-3 1.37 1.37 6.36 0.9915 1.93 
1-5 0.80 0.74 0.82 0.9941 0.89 
2-4 1.50 1.59 2.26 0.9965 1.37 
2-6 2.31 2.20 3.70 0.9856 1.85 
3-9 5.31 5.09 5.13 0.9668 3.09 
3-24 2.53 2.31 1.64 0.9819 1.60 
4-9 6.87 6.85 11.09 0.9673 4.55 
5-10 4.11 4.12 7.19 0.9720 3.00 
6-10 2.24 3.34 3.29 0.9750 1.88 
7-8 3.37 3.34 8.42 0.9758 2.93 
8-9 2.52 2.69 4.31 0.9423 2.02 
8-10 3.00 2.99 5.54 0.9594 2.36 
9-11 4.02 3.99 5.13 0.9548 2.65 
9-12 4.30 5.61 10.68 0.9496 3.71 
10-11 6.59 6.30 10.68 0.9491 4.35 
10-12 5.12 6.06 16.01 0.9515 4.76 
11-13 5.67 5.72 7.39 0.9557 3.58 
11-14 5.52 5.72 6.16 0.9436 3.35 
12-13 5.64 6.49 4.11 0.9490 3.15 
12-23 3.83 5.47 10.27 0.9673 3.53 
13-23 3.62 4.64 3.49 0.9756 2.38 
14-16 2.93 2.69 2.26 0.9825 1.83 
15-16 4.53 5.87 14.58 0.9381 4.38 
15-21 3.32 3.27 15.40 0.9592 3.95 
15-21 3.52 3.55 16.01 0.9658 4.12 
15-24 3.00 3.56 5.75 0.9749 2.46 
16-17 5.31 3.24 2.46 0.9447 2.49 
16-19 4.13 4.59 10.06 0.9809 3.49 
17-18 1.40 0.33 0.82 0.9801 1.00 
17-22 1.90 0.24 2.05 0.9746 1.29 
18-21 3.84 3.36 13.14 0.9573 3.75 
18-21 4.11 2.98 15.19 0.9577 4.08 
19-20 1.82 1.80 2.26 0.9921 1.47 
19-20 1.98 1.79 2.26 0.9920 1.51 
20-23 3.58 3.35 3.29 0.9873 2.22 
20-23 3.05 3.45 3.49 0.9875 2.12 
21-22 2.88 0.78 4.52 0.9694 1.96 
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In Table 4.2, the top four significant values in each index are highlighted, which are the 
weakest links in terms of the corresponding indices. We further summarize them in Table 
4.3. 
 
Table 4.3 Weakest Links as per Indices 
Index Top 4 weakest links 
BIP 4-9 10-11 11-13 12-13 
LOLP 4-9 12-13 10-11 10-12 
nEPL 10-12 15-21* 18-21 15-16 
POS 15-16 8-9 11-14 12-13 
ISV 10-12 4-9 15-16 10-11 
* either of the double lines   
 
From Table 4.3 we learn that the line 4-9 is the weakest link from the viewpoint of BIP and 
LOLP. Line 10-12 is the weakest link with respect to nEPL. POS locates line 15-16 as the 
weakest link. In this case, reliability indices in terms of adequacy and security analysis give 
different weakest link information. As we discussed before, there are a number of 
variations corresponding to system configuration, operating situation, especially protection 
system hidden failure probability.  
 
The integrated vulnerability index ISV, combining all aspects of reliability analysis, shows 
the most reasonable weakest link in the system. In this case, ISV indicates that line 10-12 is 
the weakest link by adopting weighting factors of 0.25, 0.1, 0.15 and 0.5. Obviously 
different sets of weighting factors may give different results. 
 
Figure 4.10 demonstrates the ISV with respect to various fault locations.  This type of 
figure visualizes the locational vulnerability index. 
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Figure 4.10 Locational ISV  
 
In Figure 4.10, x-axis and y-axis denote buses in the system therefore the lattices represent 
grid component, either transmission line or transformer. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
Based on a more explicit model of components paired with protection system, a Monte 
Carlo simulation approach is developed to simulate system behavior including cascading 
outages. Besides evaluating common adequacy reliability indices BIP, LOLP, and nEPL, 
we also analyze the transient stability with the occurrence of cascading outages in the 
power system.  
 
Different reliability indices show different weakest links in the system. We could estimate 
the system vulnerable point based on individual reliability index with particular emphasis. 
However, the newly introduced vulnerability index ISV can depict the overall severity of 
the impact of cascading outages. 
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Protection failures are rare events in a power system. This can be noticed by the long 
simulation time to converge. Some variance reduction technology could be applied to 
reduce simulation time.  
 
The methodology proposed in this section does not include the influence of voltage in 
cascading outages. Also, the power outage duration is not considered for system 
vulnerability analysis either. Future studies are intended to take account of these factors. 
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V. INNOVATIVE APPROACHES FOR VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
 
Since protection hidden failures are rare events, conventional Monte Carlo simulation 
method can consume large computation time, as demonstrated in section IV. In this section 
two simulation approaches for vulnerability analysis considering protection system failures 
are proposed and developed. The first one is Importance Sampling method, which uses 
varied probability to reveal more rare events. The second one is Self-Organizing Maps 
(SOM) method, which is based on the first one and integrates neural networking 
technology to further reduce the simulation time. 
 
5.1 Importance Sampling Monte Carlo Simulation (IS-MCS) Approach 
5.1.1 Introduction 
This section introduces Importance Sampling Monte Carlo Simulation (IS-MCS) approach 
in concept and application. Importance Sampling is one of the “variance reduction” 
techniques for rare event simulation in reliability studies. In a power system, protection 
failures are rare events, which may result in cascading outages. This section demonstrates 
the application of Importance Sampling method in power system reliability analysis 
considering protection failures. The Importance Sampling technique is embedded into non-
sequential Monte Carlo Simulation to implement the stochastic properties of contingencies, 
protective response and protection system failures. Therefore, the newly developed method 
here is called Importance Sampling based Monte Carlo Simulation scheme. To evaluate the 
efficiency of the new approach, both straightforward Monte-Carlo simulation approach and 
IS-MCS approach are demonstrated and compared. The WSCC-9 is used as the test system.  
 
Since protection failures occur with a very low probability, the standard simulation suffers 
from long simulation time to converge. The properties of hidden failures in protective 
relays and their impact on power system reliability has been explored in [7][15][16]. 
However, there has been little systematic analytical or simulation methodology for 
considering cascading outages due to the complexity and difficulties. Thorp, Phadke, 
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Horowitz, and Tamronglak [34] first proposed the use of importance sampling to handle 
the difficulty encountered with rare events. Bae and Thorp [8] presented an importance 
sampling application regarding voltage related hidden failures and relay misoperations. 
However, this was not initiated from the viewpoint of reliability and some important 
reliability indices were not included. 
  
Importance Sampling has been utilized in rare events reliability analysis by some 
researchers [9][10][35]. In their research, it has been claimed that computation time saving 
is mainly achieved by reducing the random numbers generated. However, computation 
time is the problem of not only large simulation numbers, but is also attributable to the 
tools of system state evaluation, such as OPF and stability analysis, which use enormous 
computation time. 
 
In this section, Importance Sampling technique is embedded into non-sequential Monte 
Carlo simulation method to deal with protection system failures. The methodology itself is 
also evaluated through actual simulation. 
 
5.1.2 Importance Sampling Principle 
Importance sampling is a procedure for changing the probability density function of 
sampling in such a fashion that the events which make greater contributions to the 
simulation results have greater occurrence probabilities [36]. Reference [37] gives a rough 
introduction of the principle of importance sampling in simulation for reliability analysis. 
The application in simulation needs to alter the probabilities, which make the unlikely 
events more likely and processing the simulation results so that the correct answers are 
obtained.  
 
Protection failures are rare events in a power system. A direct simulation of these rare 
events would require an unrealistic amount of computation. Also each simulation would 
require a number of random number draws, putting the long-term behavior of the random 
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number generator under scrutiny [35].  
 
A fundamental parameter in Monte Carlo simulation method is the mathematical 
expectation of a given reliability index. Mathematically, importance sampling can be 
understood by expression (5.1).  
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where 
Qs  System unavailability. 
X  (x1, …, xk) is a basic event state vector. 
ψ(X) Binary function expressing the top event. of the fault tree 
(system failure). 
Pr  Actual event probability. 
PPr  Altered (simulation) event probability 
 
From (5.1), we can see that importance sampling enables the simulation to be run with 
altered probabilities so that the rare events occur more frequently. In brief, assume the 
 53
actual probability of one blackout is p, and the altered simulation probability is pp, we then 
form the estimated probability of this event as: 
pp
p
N
N
total
occuring ⋅=ρˆ         (5.2) 
 
where Noccuring is the number of times that this event occurs and Ntotal  is the total number of 
simulation samples. The mean value of ρˆ  is unbiased [38]. 
 
A simple example can demonstrate how efficient the importance sampling method is. In a 
5-component system, each component has independent failure probability of p=0.03. The 
probability of 2 and more components failure is: 
 
P=1-(5p(1-p)4+(1-p)5)=0.008472053      (5.3) 
 
Now we use simulation methods to solve this problem. Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 show the 
simulation results of straightforward MCS method and IS-MCS respectively. Here we use a 
cov=0.001 as stop criteria for both methods. 
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Figure 5.1 Result of Straightforward MCS Method 
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Figure 5.2 Result of IS-MCS Method 
 
In IS-MCS method, altered simulation probability b=2 for the component failure is used. 
The IS-MCS method takes only 8.24s to solve the problem while straightforward MCS 
consumes 405s to complete the same work. 
 
5.1.3 Path Probability Ratio 
Unlike conventional Monte Carlo simulation in which we care only about the occurrence of 
top event, when importance sampling method is embedded, we should also record the 
probability ratio along the path to the top event. We use a simple example to illustrate the 
definition of path probability ratio in Figure 5.3. 
 
L1 
L3 
p3
L2 
p2
 
Figure 5.3 Cascading Outage Illustration 
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In Figure 5.3, suppose a fault occurs in L1, L1 trips by the correct response of its protection 
device. If L3 also trips due to hidden failure of its protection system (failure probability p3) 
and L2 does not trip with its hidden failure probability p2, the cascading outage path is L1 
and L3. And the path probability ratio of this event is defined as expression (5.4). 
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where pp3 and pp2 are altered probabilities  
 
In general, if cascading outages involve a series of N consecutive exposures of hidden 
failures, n out of N hidden failure lead to misoperation, the path probability ratio can be 
described as (5.5). 
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Although the choice of the simulation probability pp is less critical than the direct 
importance sampling, some variation in the typical sample paths are observed as the rule 
for generating the pp is changed [8]. If all exposed lines are given the same probability (say 
0.5) then the resulting sample paths are somewhat different from those obtained when the 
exposed probabilities are simply scaled so the largest is 0.5. A solution is to randomize the 
rule for generating the simulation probabilities as (5.6). 
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where αj are uniform random numbers between 0 and 1.  
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The value αj =1 corresponds to uniform scaling while a value of 0 refers to setting all 
values to 0.5. Since the αj are chosen at each step, all combinations are exposed [8]. 
 
5.1.4 Reliability Indices Definition in Simulation 
In contrast to the definitions of reliability indices by straightforward MCS method in 
Section IV (equation 4.1-4.5), the corresponding reliabilities indices by IS-MCS can be 
defined as below. 
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where i : an element of set of simulations conducted. 
ri : path probability ratio up to the occurrence of the studied event in 
simulation i, otherwise it is 0. 
Ci : load curtailment during simulation i  
  N  : the total number of simulations. 
 
5.1.5 Simulation Algorithm 
Although Monte Carlo simulation can handle complicated reliability problems in a more 
realistic manner, some rare events may not get sampled during the process of convergence. 
To alleviate this difficulty, a new algorithm is proposed here to embed importance-
sampling concept into Monte Carlo simulation, which is named as importance sampling 
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based Monte Carlo simulation, or IS-MCS.  In this paper, our task is reliability adequacy 
analysis. The IS-MCS algorithm is described as below: 
 
1) Select a faulted line. 
2) Compute the impedance seen by relays for the exposed lines by conducting fault   
calculation. 
3) Resume the faulted line into the system if auto-reclosing is successful. 
4) Figure out tripping probability for each exposed lines during the fault.  
5) Determine which exposed line(s) will trip. If no new lines trips, go to step 9. 
6) Update exposed lines based on newly tripped lines. 
7) Rearrange the power injections if necessary and compute the currents on the exposed 
lines by conducting power flow calculation.  
8) Figure out tripping probability for each exposed line after the fault. Go to step 6. 
9) Record the path of cascading outages and determine the tripping probability ratio 
following the path as per equation (5.4).   
10) System evaluation. This is to judge the occurrence of reliability problem, such as Bus 
Isolation, Load Curtailment, or System Stability. 
11) Calculate the reliability indices using correspondent probability ratio multiply Noccurring 
over Ntotal. 
 
Repeating the above simulation with randomly selected initial faulted lines will give us the 
system-wide indices. The cov (coefficient of variation) is used as the convergence criterion 
in the simulation. 
 
Figure 5.4 shows the flowchart to demonstrate the IS-MCS procedure for LOLP calculation. 
Other reliability indices can be obtained by the similar process.  
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Figure 5.4 Flowchart for IS-MCS Method 
  
5.1.6 Numerical Simulation Case Study 
5.1.6.1 Test System 
The WSCC-9 bus system is used as the test system (shown in Figure 5.5). Since it is not 
complex, it can easily provide insights into cascading outages and the application of new 
methodology. 
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Figure 5.5 WSCC-9 Bus System 
 
The typical failure rate and repair rate of each component and its protection system is listed 
in Table 5.1 [32] [39].  Here we assume that the protection devices on both ends of a given 
line have the same properties.  
 
 
Table 5.1 Components and Associated Protection System Data 
 Component Protection System 
Line λ (1/year) 
µ 
(1/year) 
λp1 
(1/year) 
λp2
(1/year) 
µi
(1/year) 
µI
(1/hour) 
4-5 6 160 0.0113 0.34 4 0.25 
5-6 12 130 0.0079 0.28 4 0.25 
6-7 4 170 0.0088 0.31 4 0.25 
7-8 3 170 0.0107 0.43 4 0.25 
8-9 10 150 0.0080 0.45 4 0.25 
4-9 3.5 170 0.0143 0.40 4 0.25 
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5.1.6.2 Simulation Results 
The simulations are carried out in Dell Optiplex™ GX260, 2.40GH Pentium® 4 processor 
with 512MB RAM. 
 
1) BIP 
Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7 show the process of straightforward and importance sampling 
based Monte Carlo simulation for BIP respectively. 
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Figure 5.6 BIP by Straightforward Monte Carlo Simulation 
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Figure 5.7 BIP by IS-MCS 
 
Here we set coefficient of variation (cov) as 0.001. Both methods obtain the same results. 
Importance sampling based method only took 116.219sec to converge while 
straightforward method took 559.453sec. 
 
2) LOLP 
Figure 5.8 and Figure 5.9 show the process of conventional and importance sampling based 
Monte Carlo simulation for LOLP. 
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Figure 5.8 LOLP by Straightforward Monte Carlo Simulation 
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Figure 5.9 LOLP by IS-MCS 
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For LOLP the importance sampling based method takes less time to converge than the 
conventional method. Another observation is the difference in the simulation curves. In the 
finishing portion, the simulation curve by conventional Monte Carlo method has still some 
fluctuations whereas the one by importance sampling based method is pretty flat. In 
practice, for this case, straightforward Monte Carlo simulation should choose a smaller cov 
to achieve accurate result. 
 
3) EPL 
Figure 5.10 and Figure 5.11 show the process of conventional and importance sampling 
based Monte Carlo simulation for EPL. 
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Figure 5.10 EPL by Straightforward Monte Carlo Simulation 
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Figure 5.11 EPL by IS-MCS 
 
The importance sampling based method spends less computation time in this case. 
However, the difference is not significant. The reason is that OPF, which is very time 
consuming, is used in evaluating loss of load in the simulation process. Since we use 
altered probability, which is much higher than the actual probability, the cascading outages 
occurs more frequently. Consequently, more OPF evaluation process is incurred. Also, 
importance sampling based method has better convergence performance. 
 
4) POS 
Figure 5.12 and Figure 5.13 show the process of conventional and Importance Sampling 
based Monte Carlo simulation for Probability of Stability. 
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Figure 5.12 POS by Straightforward Monte Carlo Simulation 
 
 
Figure 5.13 POS by IS-MCS 
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System stability analysis, like OPF, is a time consuming process too. The comparison of 
straightforward MCS and IS-MCS in calculating POS reveals one important case that the 
IS-MCS does not guarantee save computation time in all situations. The reason is that when 
we use altered probability, which is much higher than the actual probability, the cascading 
outages occurs more frequently. As a result, more system stability evaluation processes are 
triggered. This phenomenon also implies that WSCC-9 bus system is a stably reliable 
system which can withstand most contingencies. Again in this case, IS-MCS method has 
better convergence performance. 
 
5.1.7 Conclusion 
Protection failures are rare events in a power system. This can be noticed by the long 
simulation time to converge. Importance sampling technique can be applied to reveal more 
rare events and perhaps reduce simulation time.  
 
Based on the explicit model of components paired with protection system, an importance 
sampling based Monte Carlo simulation approach is developed to simulate system behavior 
including cascading outages. Three typical adequacy reliability indices BIP, LOLP, EPL 
and POS are calculated to demonstrate the application. The new method is generally 
advantageous in terms of convergence. 
 
Meanwhile, our research also shows that for simulation with heavy state evaluation tasks, 
which is time consuming and repetitive, like OPF and stability analysis, the saving in 
computation time is not significant. On the contrary, IS-MCS may lose time-saving 
advantage in some cases. 
 
5.2 SOM-IS-MCS Approach 
In this section, SOM theory and its application are introduced. Particularly, the integration 
of SOM and Importance sampling method to optimize the methodology in terms of 
computation time and probabilistic features for protection failure problems are 
implemented. 
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5.2.1 Motivation 
Artificial neural network is one of the emerging and exciting developments in solving 
engineering problems such as computer vision, control and speech recognition. They mimic 
the human biological neural nets, which can learn how to recognize and classify pattern in 
an autonomous manner. In power systems, artificial neural networks have also been used in 
many areas, e.g. load forecasting, security assessment, fault diagnosis, system identification, 
and voltage control [40 - 46]. 
 
The clustering mechanism of human brain led researchers to the concept of Kohonen 
Networks. Kohonen networks, which were developed by Teuvo Kohonen during the early 
1980s, can be used in classification problems [47 - 48]. Kohonen networks are divided into 
two main subgroups based on the learning philosophy: supervised and unsupervised 
learning.  Supervised learning needs the correct desired output for a controlled adaptation 
to minimize the error between the neural output and the desired output. Learning Vector 
Quantization (LVQ) is a pattern classification method in the supervised learning class. In 
unsupervised learning, the learning process classifies similar data into clusters using 
similarity indices. Self-organizing maps (SOM) learn to recognize groups of similar input 
vectors in such a manner that neurons physically near each other in the neuron layer 
respond to similar input vectors. The combination of Self-organizing maps, Importance 
Sampling, and Monte-Carlo simulation is called the SOM-IS-MCS in this dissertation. 
SOM-IS-MCS overcomes the computation burden caused by repeated characterization of 
similar states in the power system reliability evaluation with protection failures.  
 
This section proposes another new probabilistic method involving adequacy and security 
assessment by combining SOM, Importance Sampling, and Monte-Carlo simulation. The 
main disadvantage of the use of straight Monte-Carlo simulation for reliability and security 
analysis is the time required for the characterization of sampled states. Even for Importance 
Sampling based Monte Carlo simulation, due to the repetitive and time-consuming system 
evaluation processes, the improvement is not significant for some cases. The proposed 
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approach in this section overcomes the problem of a large amount of computation time 
required of straight Monte-Carlo simulation. Data classification by SOM can reduce 
sampling data. This reduces computation time for adequacy and security indices when 
using classified data. 
 
Protection failures are rare events, which may result in cascading outages in power systems. 
From the last section, we already know that importance sampling is one efficient way for 
rare event simulation in reliability studies. However, in certain reliability analysis 
applications like OPF, importance sampling method reveals some disadvantages (Section 
5.1), which can be overcome by the introduction of SOM (Self Organizing Map). This 
section demonstrates the application of combination of importance sampling and SOM in 
power system reliability analysis considering protection failures. Both importance sampling 
and SOM techniques are embedded into non-sequential Monte Carlo simulation 
implementing the stochastic properties of contingencies, protective response and protection 
system failures. This newly developed methodology can be called “SOM + importance 
sampling” based Monte Carlo Simulation method, or SOM-IS-MCS, which can deal with 
reliability analysis with rare events efficiently. The 24-bus IEEE RTS system is used as the 
test system to demonstrate the performance of this approach. 
 
5.2.2 Self-Organizing Map (SOM) 
5.2.2.1 Structure and Algorithm of Self-Organizing Map 
The self-organizing map (SOM) is a method for unsupervised learning, based on a grid of 
artificial neurons whose weights are adapted to match input vectors in a training set. It was 
first described by the Finnish professor Teuvo Kohonen and is thus sometimes referred to 
as a Kohonen map. 
 
The structure of SOM can be simplified as in Figure 5.14 [49]. SOM consists of a standard 
input layer and a Kohonen layer. Each input neuron is connected to every neuron in the 
Kohonen layer. This Kohonen layer learns to categorize its input vectors. After computing 
the distance between input vectors and weight vectors, Kohonen layer identifies a winner 
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neuron through competitive transfer functions. All neurons that lie within a neighborhood 
surrounding the winning neuron are allowed to adjust their weights. Neurons that are 
outside the neighborhood do not adjust their weights. All neurons within a certain 
neighborhood of the winning neuron are updated using the Kohonen-rule.  
Competitive Transfer Function
 
 
Figure 5.14 Structure of Self-Organizing Maps 
 
 
The algorithm can be explained in terms of a set of artificial neurons, each having its own 
physical location on the output map, which take part in a winner-take-all process (a 
competitive network) where a node with its weight vector closest to the vector of inputs is 
declared the winner and its weights are adjusted making them closer to the input vector. 
Each node has a set of neighbors. When this node wins a competition, the neighbors' 
weights are also changed. They are not changed as much though. The further the neighbor 
is from the winner, the smaller its weight change. This process is then repeated for each 
input vector, over and over, for a number (usually large) of cycles. Different inputs produce 
different winners. 
 
Each neuron j in the Kohonen layer is represented by an n-dimensional weight vector wj = 
[ wj1 wj2 ---wjn ].  The input vectors to the SOM are represented by X = [ X1 X2 --- Xi --- 
Xo ] where o is the number of the input vectors. The dimension of each input vector is the 
Kohonen 
layer || distance || 
Input layer 
 
Weight 
vector 
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same as that of the weight vector. The input vector in our studies is the transmission line 
contingencies in the process of simulation in the next section. The dimension of weight 
vector is the same as the sum of the number of transmission lines (n). The algorithm to map 
the system states into the neuron is described below.  
 
1) Initialize weight vectors and decide the parameters of SOM such as topology, distance 
function and learning rate.  
2) Start learning while a stopping criterion is not reached. The stopping condition can be 
used as wj(t+1)≈ wj(t). 
3) For each input vector Xi, compute Euclidean distances between neurons and the input 
vector Xi. 
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  where 
   Xi        : the ith input vector. 
    wj(t)  : the jth weight vector at time t. 
4) Find a winner neuron j with the minimum distance. 
         (5.12) 
 minarg jdc =
5) Update weight vectors (wj(t)) within a specified neighborhood for a winner neuron using 
Kohonen -rule. 
  ))()(()()()()1( i twtXthtatwtw jcjjj −⋅⋅+=+ for   )(thj cj∈   (5.13) 
 )()1( twtw jj =+           for   )(thj cj∉   (5.14) 
             where  a(t) : learning rate  
               hcj(t) : topological neighborhood  
6)  Update learning rate a(t), which is a monotonically decreasing function.  
7)  Reduce the radius of topological neighborhood hcj(t). 
8)  Increase the iteration number t = t+1. 
9)  Check stopping condition. Go to Step-2. 
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The fundamental idea of SOM can be understood as the vicinity concept based on the 
distance between neurons and each input vector, which means input data near a neuron may 
match this neuron. Only a neuron with a minimum distance between input vectors and a 
weight vector is updated in the equation (5.13) or (5.14) until the current weight vector is 
the same as the previous.  The state of neuron called by weight vectors changes its value 
during learning. The final weight vectors, called the state of neurons, are only taken as 
input data for the state characterization.  
 
The selection of topology including the number of map units (the number of neurons), the 
lattice type and the map dimension is one of the most important factors to obtain 
satisfactory results. The number of map units and map dimension may increase as the 
number of input vectors increases. There are three different topologies for the original 
neuron locations such as grid, hexagonal, rectangular, and random topology. 
 
The learning structure has important parameters such as the map initialization, the 
neighborhood function and the learning rate function. There are three kinds of map 
initialization; random, linear or hexagonal. If random initialization is chosen, a different 
result may be obtained. The neighborhood function has several possible choices such as 
bubble, Gaussian, cut Gaussian, and Ep function. The learning rate starts at the ordering-
phase (Rough-tuning) and decreases until it reaches the tuning-phase (Fine-tuning). The 
learning rate continues to decrease very slowly during the tuning-phase. The neighborhood 
size shrinks and learning rate value within the neighborhood also decreases towards zero. 
Both the shrinkage of neighborhood and the decrease in the learning rate change slowly. 
 
The optimal selection of topology and learning structure is based on the quantization error. 
The quantization error is defined as the mean of || x - wc || over all learning states where x 
is the input learning vector and wc is the nearest weight vector to x.  
 
5.2.2.2 Formulation of Self-Organizing Map 
Based on the Self-Organizing Map algorithm introduced above, we will formulate Self-
 72
Organizing Map with actual system data for reliability analysis. 
 
1) Input Data 
The input vector consists of the states of transmission lines, either up or down. Thus the 
dimension of each input data is the total number of transmission lines in the system. The 
number of learning pattern should be large enough to cover most cases occurs frequently. 
 
2) Topology Structure 
The number of map units (the number of neurons) and dimension will be determined by 
training process itself and may increase as the number of input vectors increases. The 
number of weighting vectors should be equal to that of map units. The lattice type can be 
chosen as either hexagonal or rectangular. 
 
3) Learning Structure 
Since the elements of input vectors are 1 and 0, linear initialization is chosen among 
random, linear and hexagonal initializations. There are several possible options for 
neighborhood function such as bubble function, Gaussian function, cut Gaussian function 
and ep function. The neighborhood distance starts as the maximum distance between two 
neurons, and decreases to the tuning neighborhood distance.  
 
There are also several learning rate functions such as inverse function, linear function and 
power function. The learning rate starts from the ordering phase (rough tuning) learning 
rate and decrease until it reaches the tuning-phase (fine tuning) learning rate. The learning 
rate continues to decrease from the tuning phase learning rate, but very slowly. 
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5.2.3 Simulation Algorithm 
Although Monte Carlo simulation can handle complicated reliability problem in a more 
realistic manner, as we pointed out before, it generally takes much longer time to converge 
than analytical reliability assessment methods. Moreover, when we focus on rare events, 
some of them may not get sampled during the process of convergence. To alleviate these 
difficulties, in this section, the importance sampling and SOM techniques are embedded 
into Monte Carlo simulation.  
 
The simulation algorithm is composed of three modules; “system state generation”, “SOM 
implementation” and “SOM utilization”. Importance sampling is applied in both “system 
state generation” and “SOM utilization” modules. 
 
5.2.3.1 System State Generation 
 System state generation module is shown in Figure 5.15. This module simulates power 
system state with all its stochastic features with consideration of protection failures. The 
system states generated will be used in following modules. 
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Figure 5.15 Flowchart of System State Generation 
 
5.2.3.2 SOM Implementation 
Flowchart in Figure 5.16 shows the implementation of SOM. 
Input vectors represent component (transmission line) states. Learning set, composed of 
input vectors, should have sufficient information to identify patterns. Here, we use system 
state generation module rather than direct random state sampling to determine input vectors. 
In other words, the learning set is only those states that will actually occur in the simulation. 
As a result, the requirement for the number of learning set will be reduced. 
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Figure 5.16 Flowchart of SOM Implementation 
 
After the learning process, the mapped neurons are formed and the weighting vectors of 
neurons match the input vectors. Only those neurons that actually match learning set are 
taken as component states for system evaluation, i.e. OPF, by which the amount of load 
curtailment will be calculated. The evaluation results are labeled to the neurons. 
 
5.2.3.3 SOM Utilization 
The flowchart in Figure 5.17 shows the final simulation process to calculate nEPL. Other 
reliability indices can be obtained from the similar procedure.  
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Figure 5.17 Flowchart of SOM Utilization 
 
This procedure integrates both “system state generation” module and “SOM 
implementation” module. In calculating load curtailment, direct OPF calculation is not 
needed anymore generally. Instead, the results can be obtained from on-line use of SOM 
since the mapped neurons have been labeled with the amount of load curtailment already in 
the SOM implementation module. Nevertheless, for the cases that the neurons being 
matched has not been evaluated before, of course it is rare provided the number of learning 
set is big enough, extra OPF calculation will be performed and the result will be recorded 
for the next time use. 
 
5.2.4 Case Study 
The 24-bus IEEE Reliability Test System (RTS) [33] is used again here to demonstrate the 
calculation.  
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5.2.4.1 SOM Formulation 
The selection of learning set is very important step for implementation of SOM [50].  Since 
we use real time system simulation rather than direct random sampling to generate input 
vectors, the requirement for the number of learning set can be small. Table 5.2 shows the 
key SOM parameters for IEEE RTS. 
 
Table 5.2 Key SOM Parameters for 24-bus IEEE RTS 
Dimension 38 Input vector No. of learning pattern 500 
No. of map unit 112 Topology Lattice type Rectangular 
Map initialization Linear 
Neighborhood type Ep Learning structure 
Learning rate function Linear 
  
5.2.4.2 Simulation Process 
Figure 5.18 and Figure 5.19 show the simulation process of nEPL and POS calculation 
respectively, in which we choose coefficient of variance (cov) 0.001 as convergence 
criteria. 
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Figure 5.18 nEPL by SOM-IS-MCS 
 
 
Figure 5.19 POS by SOM-IS-MCS 
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When the number of learning pattern is set as 500, the number of neurons is 112, of which 
only 82 neurons actually represent the learning patterns in the learning process. Only the 
weighting vectors of those 82 neurons are taken as input vectors for state evaluation (Load 
curtailment by OPF calculation). In the following SOM application process, 4 additional 
neurons need to be evaluated. Therefore, instead of 112 OPF calculations, we only conduct 
86 OPF calculations for the entire simulation. 
 
5.2.4.3 Comparison of Results and Observations 
We calculate nEPL and POS by straightforward Monte Carlo simulation and importance 
sampling based Monte Carlo simulation also to compare the efficiency of the methodology 
newly proposed. All simulations are carried out in Dell Optiplex™ GX260, 2.40GH 
Pentium® 4 processor with 512MB RAM. The results are listed in Table 5.3. 
 
 
Table 5.3 Simulation Comparison 
Simulation 
 Method 
Coefficient 
of  
Variance 
nEPL Computation Time (Sec) POS 
Computation 
Time (Sec) 
Straightforward 
MCS 0.001 0.0549 5654 0.9561 607 
IS-MCS 0.001 0.0502 11309 0.9637 1719 
SOM-IS-MCS 0.001 0.0473 1815 0.9480 840 
 
 
From Table 5.3 we see that the importance sampling based simulation method spends much 
longer computation time. The reason is that OPF, which is very time consuming, is used in 
evaluating loss of load in the simulation process. Since we use altered probability, which is 
much higher than the actual probability, the cascading outages occurs more frequently. 
Consequently, more OPF evaluation process is incurred.  The application of SOM can 
solve this problem efficiently.  
 
Similarly for POS comparison, System Stability Evaluation, like OPF, is another time 
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consuming process. IS-MCS will cost more time than straightforward Monte Carlo 
Simulation. With SOM-IS-MCS, both accuracy and time-saving can be achieved.   
 
5.2.5 Conclusion 
Protection failures are rare events in a power system. This can be noticed by the long 
simulation time to converge. Importance sampling technique can be applied to reveal more 
rare events but not guarantee to reduce simulation time.  
 
Based on the explicit model of components paired with protection system, an importance 
sampling + SOM based Monte Carlo simulation approach is developed to simulate system 
behavior including cascading outages. Reliability index nEPL and POS are calculated to 
demonstrate the application. The new method is advantageous in terms of convergence. 
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VI. TOTAL TRANSFER CAPABILITY*
 
6.1 Introduction 
Total Transfer Capability (TTC) is the largest value of electric power that can be 
transferred over the interconnected transmission network in a reliable manner without 
violation of specified constraints. TTC is the key component for calculating Available 
Transfer Capability (ATC). The relationship of TTC and ATC is described in NERC report 
[51]: ATC equals TTC less the sum of the Transmission Reliability Margin (TRM), 
Existing Transmission Commitments (ETS) and Capacity Benefit Margin (CBM). 
 
There are a number of methods and algorithms for computing TTC. Only three of them are 
practical for large realistic applications [52]. These are  
• Security Constrained Optimal Power Flow (SCOPF) method.  
• Continuation Power Flow (CPF) method [53-54]. 
• Repeated Power Flow (RPF) method. 
 
SCOPF method needs to calculate a large number of OPFs under different postulated 
system conditions. It is obviously a time consuming approach. The CPF method, whose 
implementation involves parameterization, predictor, corrector and step-size control, is 
mathematically complicated. The RPF method, which repeatedly solves power flow 
equations at a succession of points along the specified load/generation increment, is used in 
this paper for TTC calculation. Compared with SCOPF and CPF, the implementation of 
RPF is much easier and it also provides part of V-P, V-Q curves, which facilitates the 
potential analysis of voltage stability [55]. 
 
                                                 
* Part of this section is reprinted with permission from “Total Transfer Capability Considering FACTS and 
Security Constraints” by Xingbin Yu, Chanan Singh, Sasa Jakovljevic, Dragan Ristanovic, and Garng Huang, 
2003. IEEE PES Transmission & Distribution Conference and Exposition, Volume: 1. pp. 73-78. © 2004 by 
IEEE. 
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The TTC is a function of thermal, voltage and transient stability limits of the system. All 
three limits restrict the value of TTC. The previous work on calculating TTC considers 
only the first two constraints, i.e. thermal limit and voltage magnitude limit [52-55]. The 
results without considering transient stability limit are prone to be somewhat optimistic and 
would not represent the actual system performance. Following those values in operation 
may lead to system instability in case of contingencies. In this section, an algorithm that 
incorporates all three constraints to calculate the TTC is established. Therefore this 
approach is expected to yield more realistic results. 
 
In this section, two topics are selected in analyzing TTC. The first one is the discussion of 
the effects of Flexible AC Transmission System (FACTS) devices on Total Transfer 
Capability (TTC). The second one is the probabilistic analysis of Total Transfer Capability 
considering security constraints. 
  
6.2 Total Transfer Capability Considering FACTS and Security Constraints 
6.2.1 Introduction  
In the power industry term FACTS (Flexible AC Transmission Systems) covers a number 
of technologies that enhance the security, capacity and flexibility of power transmission 
systems. FACTS solutions enable power grid owners to increase existing transmission 
network capacity while maintaining or improving the operating margins necessary for grid 
stability. As a result, more power can reach consumers with a minimum impact on the 
environment, with substantially shorter project implementation times, and at lower 
investment costs - all compared to the alternative of building new transmission lines or 
power generation facilities. The two main reasons for incorporating FACTS devices in 
electric power systems are: 
• Raising dynamic stability limits 
• Provide better power flow control 
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Thyristor Controlled Series Capacitors (TCSC) provides a proven technology that 
addresses specific dynamic problems in transmission systems. TCSC's are an excellent tool 
to introduce if increased damping is required when interconnecting large electrical systems. 
Additionally, they can overcome the problem of Sub-Synchronous Resonance (SSR), a 
phenomenon that involves an interaction between large thermal generating units and series 
compensated transmission systems. 
 
Electrical loads both generate and absorb reactive power. Since the transmitted load varies 
considerably from one hour to another, the reactive power balance in a grid varies as well. 
The result can be unacceptable voltage amplitude variations, a voltage depression, or even 
a voltage collapse. A rapidly operating Static Var Compensator (SVC) can continuously 
provide the reactive power required to control dynamic voltage swings under various 
system conditions and thereby improve the power system transmission and distribution 
performance. Installing an SVC at one or more suitable points in the network can increase 
transfer capability and reduce losses while maintaining a smooth voltage profile under 
different network conditions. In addition, an SVC can mitigate active power oscillations 
through voltage amplitude modulation. 
 
6.2.2 Formulation of the Problem 
6.2.2.1 TTC without TCSC and SVC 
RPF formulation for TTC without TCSC and SVC (base case) is expressed as follows: 
 
Max  ( ) ( ) ( )( )SinkjDSinkjDSourceiGlinestie jji QPPfP ∈∈∈− = ,,      
   
Subject to:  
 
( 0sincos
1
=+−− ∑
=
n
j
ijijijijjiDiGi BGUUPP δδ )     (6.1) 
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 ( 0cossin
1
=−−− ∑
=
n
j
ijijijijjiDiGi BGUUQQ δδ )     (6.2) 
maxmin iii
UUU ≤≤         (6.3) 
  
maxijij
SS ≤           (6.4) 
 ( ) ( ) maxGGjGi tt δδδ ≤−        (6.5) 
where: 
DP   : the total real power load on all load buses. 
linestieP −  : the summation of real power flow on tie lines 
GiP ,  : real and reactive power generation at bus i GiQ
DiP ,  : real and reactive load at bus i DiQ
  n  : number of system buses 
iU   : voltage magnitude at bus i 
ijG ,  : real and imaginary part of the ijijB
th element of bus admittance matrix. 
ijδ   : voltage angle difference between bus i and bus j 
ijS   : apparent power flow in line ij 
mini
U   : lower limit of voltage magnitude at bus i  
maxi
U     : upper limit of voltage magnitud at bus i 
 
maxij
S   : thermal limit of line ij 
( )tGiδ   : rotor angle of generator i 
maxGδ     : maximum secure relative swing angle. 
  
In the process of calculation, ,  and  are changed in following ways [41] GiP DiP DiQ
 
( GiGGi kPP λ+= 101 )         (6.6) 
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( DiDDi kPP λ+= 101 )
)
        (6.7) 
 
( DiDDi kQQ λ+= 101         (6.8) 
 
where  
0
1GP   : base case real power generation at bus i 
0
1DP ,  : base case real and reactive load at bus i 
0
1DQ
λ   : increment factor in bus load or generation 
Gik ,  : constants specifying the rate of change in generation and load Dik
  
According to (7.6)~(7.8), we can increase the apparent load with constant power factor at 
each bus in the sink area and increase injected real power at each generator bus in the 
source area in successive steps until one or more limits are reached. 
 
6.2.2.2 TTC with TCSC 
When TCSC is installed in a transmission line, the reactance of the line can be adjusted. 
Normally the adjustment range is 0.5X to 1.5X, where X is the reactance of the original 
line. The formulation of TTC can be expressed as below: 
 
Max  ( ) ( ) ( )( )SinkjDSinkjDSourceiGlinestie jji QPPfP ∈∈∈− = ,,  
 
Subject to: 
( 0sincos
1
=+−− ∑
=
n
j
ijijijijjiDiGi BGUUPP δδ )     (6.9) 
 ( 0cossin
1
=−−− ∑
=
n
j
ijijijijjiDiGi BGUUQQ δδ )     (6.10) 
maxmin iii
UUU ≤≤         (6.11) 
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maxijij
SS ≤           (6.12) 
        (6.13) XXX TCSC 5.05.0 ≤≤−
 ( ) ( ) maxGGjGi tt δδδ ≤−        (6.14) 
 
where: 
TCSCijG − ,  : real and imaginary part of the ijTCSCijB −
th element of bus admittance  
matrix when TCSC is installed.  
TCSCX    : reactance of TCSC 
  X   : original reactance of the line where TCSC is installed 
 
 
6.2.2.3 TTC with SVC 
SVC is a shunt compensation component. When it is installed in the transmission line, it 
can be treated as a PV bus with zero generation of real power [9]. The formulation of TTC 
using RPF can be represented as follows: 
 
Max  ( ) ( ) ( )( )SinkjDSinkjDSourceiGlinestie jji QPPfP ∈∈∈− = ,,  
 
Subject to: 
( 0sincos
1
=+−− ∑
=
n
j
ijijijijjiDiGi BGUUPP δδ )     (6.15) 
 ( 0cossin
1
=−−− ∑
=
n
j
ijijijijjiDiGi BGUUQQ δδ )     (6.16) 
maxmin iii
UUU ≤≤         (6.17) 
  
maxijij
SS ≤           (6.18) 
 0          (6.19) =SVCP
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 ( ) ( ) maxGGjGi tt δδδ ≤−        (6.20) 
 
where: 
SVCijG − ,  : real and imaginary part of the ijSVCijB −
th element of bus admittance 
matrix when SVC is installed.  
SVCP          : real power output of the additional PV bus representing the 
SVC  
 
 
6.2.2.4 Security Constraint Model 
Among the three constraints in TTC calculation, thermal and voltage magnitude limits are 
easier to implement. However, transient stability constraint needs special procedure to deal 
with.  
 
Power system stability considers the dynamic behavior of the power system after a 
contingency [56]. Power system stability denotes a condition in which various synchronous 
machines of the system remain "in synchronism" or "in step" with each other [57]. 
Therefore, the security assessment can be conducted by checking generator rotor angles in 
the n-1 contingency scenario. In this paper, swing equation model is used to handle 
stability analysis directly. A typical swing-equation model includes second-order 
differential equations associated with generator buses and algebraic equations for other 
buses. For generator buses, we have: 
 
gimiGiiGii PPDM −=+ δδ &&&        i=1,…,n             (6.21) 
 
where  
Giδ  : the generator rotor angle. 
Pmi : the mechanical power input 
 88
Pgi : the electrical power input 
n  : the number of generators 
Mi  : the ith-generator’s inertia coefficient 
Di   : the ith-generator’s damping coefficient 
 
Mechanical power Pmi is equal to the pre-fault electrical power, which can be obtained by 
power flow calculation. Electric power output is given as (7.22): 
 
(∑
=
+−=
n
j
GjGiijijjigi YVVP
1
cos δδθ )    i=1,…,n    (6.22) 
 
where Yij  is the reduced bus admittance matrix. 
 
In this section, fixed typical fault clearing time is used in stability analysis. The transient 
stability criterion is that within a certain period after the occurrence of fault, the difference 
of any two rotor angles does not exceed the maximum secure relative swing angle, which is 
set as 180°. 
 
6.2.3 Methodology and Implementation 
The methodology suggested in this paper includes both steady state and dynamic security 
constraints. The general procedure to calculate TTC with TCSC/SVC can be described as 
follows: 
1) If TCSC is installed, set initial TCSC=-0.5X. If SVC is installed, set initial position, 
normally at one line end. 
2) Select the base case and solve the power flow. 
3) Use RPF to make a step increase in generation and load.  
4) Establish and solve the power flow problem according to the modified system 
condition; conduct stability assessment under the current condition. 
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5) Check the power flow solution to see whether thermal limit or voltage limit are 
violated. Check stability assessment result to see whether security limit is violated. If 
none of these limits are violated, go to step 3). Otherwise go to step 6). 
 
 
6) Take opposite step of RPF to eliminate all violations in minimum steps. Compute the 
TTC level.  
7) If TCSC is installed, increase the reactance of TCSC by a specified increment, go to 
step 2) until the reactance of TCSC reaches 0.5X. If SVC is installed, move the SVC 
location along the line in a certain step until the end of the line is reached. The 
maximum values of the TTC associated with each TCSC reactance or SVC location 
are the final results. 
 
Based on the above procedure, a user-friendly software package is developed. The full 
software functionality is controlled by Graphical User Interface (GUI), which facilitates 
effective and flexible analysis for various system conditions. Different test systems, 
analysis types, operation modes and corresponding system conditions can be easily chosen. 
Both graphic and numerical outputs are available for assessment. Graphic output results 
include the relation of TTC and value of TCSC applied, relation of TTC and position of 
SVC installed, and swing curves of generator phase angles. One snapshot of the interface is 
shown in Figure 6.1. 
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Figure 6.1 GUI of the Software Package 
 
6.2.4 Case Study 
6.2.4.1 Test System 
The WSCC-9 bus system (shown in Figure 6.2) is used as the test. Three areas are 
identified for TTC analysis, in which we focus on the transfer capability from Area-2 to 
Area-3. 
 
The transmission line parameters are shown in Figure 6.2 too. The base case system loads 
are listed in Table 6.1. 
 
Fixed thermal limits for transmission lines are set as in Table 6.2. Transformers are 
assumed to have infinite thermal limit. 
 
 91
Protective zone II tripping time is used as typical fault clearing time for n-1 contingency 
stability analysis. 
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Figure 6.2 WSCC-9 Bus System 
 
Table 6.1 WSCC-9 Base Case Load 
Load A Load B Load C 
90MW 100MW 125MW 
 
 
Table 6.2 WSCC-9 Transmission Line Thermal Limits 
Line 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 9-4 
Thermal limit (MVA) 50 115 70 150 150 80 
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6.2.4.2 Impact of FACTS Devices on Stability 
It has been known that FACTS devices are designed and installed to enhance system 
stability to some extent. However, this may not be true in all cases. In this section we 
demonstrate the negative influence of SVC and TCSC devices on power system stability in 
some particular cases. The location of SVC is set at 50% of transmission line under 
consideration and TCSC factor is set to -0.5X. The base case system load is applied. 
 
1) Effect of TCSC 
Figure 6.3 presents an example of negative influence of TCSC devices.   
 
Two lines observed in this case are line 6-7 where SVC is installed and line 7-8 where the 
fault was applied. Fault clearing time that roughly corresponds to zone II tripping is 
selected as 0.48 sec. This corresponds to the delayed clearing from the remote end of the 
line 7-8 and gives greater influence of the system on the right-hand side of the fault. Since 
SVC is installed in line 6-7 and increases right-hand side fault in feed, the system is more 
prone to instability. 
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Figure 6.3 Negative Influence of TCSC on System Stability Illustration 
 
2) Effect of SVC 
The same fault and protection scenario is selected for SVC device as 1). In this case, the 
influence of SVC device proved to have negative impact on the system transient stability 
too. This is illustrated in Figure 6.4. 
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Figure 6.4 Negative Influence of SVC on System Stability Illustration 
 
Another example that TCSC has greater impact on the system stability than SVC can be 
observed in comparison of the above two cases. In fact, in both cases, both TCSC and SVC 
cause system instability, but the magnitude of generator oscillations increased in the case 
when TCSC was applied. 
 
6.2.4.3 TTC Analysis 
Two sets of voltage limit, the broad one and the narrow one, are applied to analysis. The 
loose one is expected to allow the thermal limit violation to occur and we call it “thermal 
limit dominant” case. The narrow one, on the other hand, makes voltage magnitude 
violation normally happen and we call it “voltage limit dominant” case. 
 
1) Effect of TCSC 
Case-1: Voltage Limit 0.90<|V|<1.10 
 95
Table 6.3 gives two sets of results, one of which does not include stability constraint and 
the other does. Without considering stability constraint, the base case transfer capability is 
122.0MVA and the installation of TCSC improves the transfer capability. The maximum 
improvement (16.1%) occurs when TCSC is installed on line 8-9.  
 
Table 6.3 Effect of TCSC on TTC (Thermal Limit Dominant) 
Without considering stability Considering stability 
TCSC 
Installed on 
Transfer 
Capability 
Violation 
Transfer 
Capability
Violation 
Null 122.0 Thermal: 8-9 102.3 Stability: 7-8 
4-5 122.6 Thermal: 8-9 102.9 Stability: 7-8 
5-6 140.7 Thermal: 8-9 102.9 Stability: 7-8 
6-7 123.2 Thermal: 8-9 104.8 Stability: 7-8 
7-8 128.7 Thermal: 8-9 104.1 Stability: 7-8 
8-9 141.6 Thermal: 8-9 105.4 Stability: 8-9 
4-9 123.1 Thermal: 8-9 102.9 Stability: 8-9 
 
 
On the other hand, when considering stability constraint, the base case transfer capability is 
decreased to 102.3MVA. Stability violations occurred in all other cases and there is not 
much improvement for TTC by installing TCSC in these cases.  
 
Without consideration of stability, TCSC could have significant effect on increasing the 
transfer capability, and this matches the conclusion from reference [55]. However, that 
conclusion may not always be true when stability limit is incorporated.  
 
Case-2: Voltage Limit 0.95<|V|<1.05 
Without considering stability constraint, this case would be a “pure” voltage limit dominant 
case. Table 6.4 shows the results. The base-case TTC is the same for both conditions. This 
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is because for either condition, the voltage limit always hits first. After installing TCSC, the 
transfer capability increases. When TCSC is installed in different lines, the effect varies. 
That also matches the conclusion in [55]. When considering stability constraint, either 
voltage limit or transient stability limit might hit for TTC calculation. This demonstrates 
the importance of taking the stability into account in TTC calculation. When TCSC is 
installed in line 4-9, which is connected to the bus-9 with voltage violation, the effect is 
significant. The case where TCSC is installed in line 5-6 also gives good effect. That is 
because the installation of TCSC in that line changes the power flow with positive effect on 
the transfer capability. 
 
Table 6.4 Effect of TCSC on TTC (Voltage Limit Dominant) 
Without considering stability Considering stability 
TCSC 
Installed on 
Transfer 
Capability 
Violation 
Transfer 
Capability 
Violation 
Null 96.5 Voltage: 9 96.5 Voltage: 9 
4-5 97.4 Voltage: 9 97.4 Voltage: 9 
5-6 121.3 Voltage: 9 102.9 Stability: 7-8 
6-7 103.8 Voltage: 9 103.8 Voltage: 9 
7-8 107.9 Voltage: 9 104.1 Stability: 7-8 
8-9 102.8 Voltage: 9 102.8 Voltage: 9 
4-9 120.8 Voltage: 9 102.9 Stability: 8-9 
 
 
2) Effect of SVC 
Case-1: Voltage Limit 0.90<|V|<1.10 
Table 6.5 shows the results of the effect of SVC on TTC. When considering stability 
constraints, the base case TTC decreased 16.2% from 122.0MVA to 102.3MVA. After 
installing SVC, no obvious improvement is found from the results in Table 6.5. Therefore, 
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the SVC cannot improve the transfer capability in thermal limit dominant cases. Stability 
limit further confines the TTC. 
 
Table 6.5 Effect of SVC on TTC (Thermal Limit Dominant) 
Without considering stability Considering stability SVC 
Installed on Transfer Capability Violation 
Transfer 
Capability Violation 
Null 122.0 Thermal: 8-9 102.3 Stability: 7-8 
4-5 123.3 Thermal: 8-9 102.3 Stability: 7-8 
5-6 123.3 Thermal: 8-9 102.3 Stability: 7-8 
6-7 124.7 Thermal: 8-9 102.3 Stability: 7-8 
7-8 122.4 Thermal: 8-9 104.8 Stability: 8-9 
8-9 122.4 Thermal: 8-9 102.3 Stability: 8-9 
4-9 122.4 Thermal: 8-9 102.3 Stability: 7-8 
 
 
Case-2: Voltage Limit 0.95<|V|<1.05 
Transfer capability without SVC decreases due to the narrow voltage limit margin. In both 
conditions the voltage limits are hit for base case TTC. The installation of SVC can fairly 
improve the TTC from Table 6.6 
 
Table 6.6 Effect of SVC on TTC (Voltage Limit Dominant) 
Without considering stability Considering stability SVC 
Installed on Transfer Capability Violation 
Transfer 
Capability Violation 
Null 96.5 Voltage 9 96.5 Voltage 9 
4-5 123.3 Thermal: 8-9 102.3 Stability: 7-8 
5-6 116.2 Voltage 9 102.3 Stability: 7-8 
6-7 110.6 Voltage 9 102.3 Stability: 7-8 
7-8 122.4 Thermal: 8-9 104.8 Stability: 7-8 
8-9 122.4 Thermal: 8-9 102.3 Stability: 8-9 
4-9 122.4 Thermal: 8-9 102.3 Stability: 7-8 
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In this case, either thermal limit or voltage limit might be hit when stability constraint is not 
taken into account. When stability is considered, however, the stability limit becomes the 
bottleneck except for the base case. 
 
3) Comparison of Results 
Table 6.7 summarizes the TTC results with the most significant improvements under 
various conditions. 
 
Table 6.7 Comparison of the Effect of TCSC and SVC on TTC 
 Without considering stability Considering stability 
 0.90<|V|<1.1 0.95<|V|<1.05 0.9<|V|<1.1 0.95<|V|<1.05 
TTC 
(base case) 
122.0 96.5 102.3 96.5 
TTC 
with TCSC 
141.6 121.3 105.4 104.1 
Improvement 16.1% 25.7% 3.0% 7.9% 
TTC 
with SVC 
124.7 123.3 104.8 104.8 
Improvement 2.2% 27.8% 2.4% 8.6% 
 
 
From Table 6.7, it is observed that when transient stability is not considered, TCSC and 
SVC improve TTC significantly for voltage limit dominant cases while only TCSC 
improves TTC for thermal limit dominant cases. On the other hand, when stability 
constraint is considered the improvement drops. 
 
6.2.5 Conclusion 
A comprehensive approach for TTC calculation is established with consideration of 
thermal, voltage and transient stability limits. Based on this approach, both steady state and 
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dynamic security assessments are included in the process of obtaining total transfer 
capability. The studies reported indicate that TTC without considering transient stability 
limits is prone to give optimistic results. 
 
The FACTS devices have both positive and negative effects on system stability depending 
on their location. In order to evaluate the effects of FACTS devices on TTC, all critical 
factors need to be taken into account simultaneously. 
 
Fault conditions such as fault location and fault duration time are major factors in 
determining the system stability. In this paper, fixed fault location and fault duration time 
are used for stability analysis. However, a fault condition varies greatly based on the nature 
of fault and protection device/scheme applied. Therefore, probabilistic stability analysis is 
expected to give more realistic results in TTC calculations.  
 
6.3 Probabilistic Analysis of Total Transfer Capability 
6.3.1 Motivation 
Due to the uncertainty of power system behavior, discrete events such as unexpected circuit 
or unit outage can result in a decrease of transfer capability considerably [58]. It is 
impossible to give a fixed TTC results under all conditions. Furthermore, in system 
operation, transmission risk analysis needs a statistical forecast for an expected range of 
transfer capability. Therefore, it is important to study TTC problem from a probabilistic 
point of view. Some research has been performed to include various probabilistic models 
for load and generation [59-62]. However, probabilistic transient stability analysis is 
seldom considered. Fault conditions such as fault location and fault duration time are major 
factors in determining the system stability. In fact, a fault condition varies greatly based on 
the nature of fault and protection device/scheme applied. Therefore, probabilistic stability 
analysis is one of the most important factors in calculating TTC. 
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In this section, we establish a probabilistic algorithm that incorporates all three constraints 
to calculate the TTC. This approach is expected to yield more realistic and useful results. 
 
The formulation of the TTC calculation considering security constraints is the same as 
described in 6.2.2.1. In this section, we will focus on probabilistic methodology and its 
implementation. 
 
6.3.2 Stochastic Features 
For security analysis, probabilistic factors must be taken into consideration. There are 
many uncertainties in terms of system contingencies and corresponding responses. The 
following stochastic features are considered in security analysis. 
 
6.3.2.1 Type of fault 
A variety of contingencies might happen in a power system. As for the vulnerability 
analysis, however, we assume all faults to be three-phase, either transient or permanent. 
This strategy will yield somewhat conservative results. 
 
6.3.2.2 Location of fault 
The fault probabilities of transmission lines are calculated from their forced outage data. 
On the particular faulted line, the fault location is assumed to follow uniform distribution 
model 
 
6.3.2.3 Fault clearing time 
A normal probability distribution model is used to represent the fault clearing time. 
 
6.3.2.4 Reclosing time 
The probabilities associated with the auto-reclosing time are assumed to be normally 
distributed. 
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6.3.2.5 Fault duration 
The distribution of fault duration is assumed Rayleigh. 
 
All these five stochastic features influence the actual TTC value when security constraint is 
concerned 
 
6.3.3 Methodology and Implementation 
The methodology suggested in this section includes both steady state and dynamic security 
constraints. The general procedure to calculate TTC can be described as follows. The first 
step is to calculate TTC without considering the transient stability constraint. This TTC 
value is generally optimistic since the transient stability constraint is not considered yet. 
The second step is to perform transient stability analysis based on the TTC calculated in the 
first step by simulating stochastic features of the contingencies. For each selected 
contingency, opposite step of RPF may be taken to remove the transient stability violation 
if any. The second step will be carried out repeatedly until convergence is achieved. 
 
As a matter of fact, the second step described above is the procedure of Monte Carlo 
simulation. The flowchart in Figure 6.5 shows the algorithm more clearly. 
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Start
Set bus voltage and line thermal limits
Increase load in receiving area and generation in 
sending area until violation of voltage or thermal limit 
Record current system condition (load and 
generation) as initial system condition
N=0, TTC=0
Set initial system condition for stability analysis
Select a contingency: faulted line, fault location, 
fault clearing time and auto-reclosing action
Apply the contingency parameters and 
perform stability evaluation
Stable?
Calculate ttc
N=N+1,  TTC=TTC+ttc
Avg TTC=TTC/N
Avg TTC Converge?
Decrease load 
and generation
Stop
Y
N
N
Y
 
 
Figure 6.5 Flowchart of the Probabilistic TTC Algorithm 
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6.3.4 Case Study 
6.3.4.1 Test System 
The WSCC-9 bus system (shown in Figure 6.2) is used again here as the test system. Three 
areas are identified for TTC analysis, in which we focus on the transfer capability from 
Area-2 to Area-3. The transmission line parameters are shown in Figure 6.2 too.  
 
The base case system loads are listed in Table 6.1. 
 
Fixed thermal limits for transmission lines are set as in Table 6.2. Transformers are 
assumed to have infinite thermal limit. The voltage limits are set as 0.90<|V|<1.10 for all 
buses. 
 
In this section, we consider only the contingencies of transformers and transmission lines. 
The reliability data, such as the failure rate and repair rate of components, fault parameter 
etc, are given in the Appendix B. 
 
6.3.4.2 The Effect of Transient Stability on TTC 
System transient stability depends not only on contingency itself, but also system operating 
conditions such as generation and loads. On the other hand, TTC is determined by the 
corresponding system conditions too. Hence there are relationships between TTC and 
transient stability. The effect of transient stability on TTC can be seen by the following 
specific case. 
 
Suppose the TTC is 145.46MW during a certain system condition without considering 
security constraint. Now a fault occurs with parameters described in Table 6.8. The 
stability evaluation is shown in Figure 6.6. 
 
 
 
 104
Table 6.8 Fault Parameters in a Specific Study Case 
Fault line 8-9 
Fault location 0.98% of line 8-9 to bus 8 
Fault clearing time 0.055sec 
Fault duration time 0.350sec 
Reclosing time 0.781sec, successful 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.6 Stability Evaluation Illustration-1 
 
From Figure 6.6 we can see that the angle differences between generator 2, 3 and generator 
1 far exceed 180°. The system has lost synchronism. That means the current system 
condition cannot sustain the normal operation when a transient fault happens. As a result, 
the TTC (145.46MW) derived originally without considering security constraint is not 
appropriate. 
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When we rearrange the system condition with consideration of security constraint, the TTC 
reduces to 110.90MW. We test the system with exactly the same fault parameters in Table 
6.8 and the stability evaluation is illustrated in Figure 6.7. Now the system is stable since 
the angle difference of any two generators does not exceed 180°. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.7 Stability Evaluation Illustration-2 
 
 
System instability is a major disturbance in power systems. This case demonstrates that it is 
infeasible to sacrifice the system stability to achieve high TTC. 
 
It should be emphasized that in our methodology, stability evaluation is not just based on 
certain pre-selected fault parameters. On the contrary, the stability evaluation follows 
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Monte Carlo simulation process which simulates all fault parameters based on real world 
stochastic features in a power system so that a more practical TTC can be given.  
 
6.3.4.3 TTC Results 
The TTC from area-2 to area-3 without considering security constraint is 149.39MW. This 
value is derived as per the first step of the methodology proposed above. It is also used as a 
base value for following TTC calculation with consideration of security constraint.  
 
Figure 6.8 illustrates the Monte Carlo simulation process for calculating the final TTC. We 
can see the TTC converges at the value of 132.44MW, much less than the one without 
considering security constraint. Since thermal, voltage and transient stability constraints are 
included, we can conclude that this converged TTC value can represent the practical TTC. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.8 TTC by Monte Carlo Simulation 
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Furthermore, the advantage of Monte Carlo simulation can be taken to provide probability 
distribution of TTC in Figure 6.9.  
 
 
Figure 6.9 Probability Distribution of TTC 
 
The majority of TTC locates in between 145-150 MW. The TTC within this range can 
withstand most of the transient fault contingencies without violating thermal and voltage 
limits.  
 
Another peak appears around 110-120MW. This means that the system can withstand some 
severe transient faults in lower TTC values.  
 
The probability distribution of TTC has useful applications in power system operation. In 
this case, for example, the probability distribution of TTC implies that the TTC can be held 
at 145-150MW as normal operating condition. However, in some critical conditions, such 
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as adverse weather situations in which some severe component contingencies are likely to 
happen, the TTC can be reduced to around 115MW for the sake of system safety. In 
addition, the probability distribution of TTC also indicates that the TTC of 120-145MW is 
not practically economical and effective. 
 
6.3.5 Conclusion 
A comprehensive approach for TTC calculation is proposed with consideration of thermal, 
voltage and transient stability limits. Based on this approach, both steady state and dynamic 
security assessments are included in the process of obtaining total transfer capability. The 
studies reported indicate that TTC without considering transient stability limits is prone to 
give optimistic results and is risky in real application. 
 
Fault conditions such as fault location and fault duration time are major factors in 
determining the system stability. A fault condition varies greatly based on the nature of 
fault and protection device/scheme applied. Only probabilistic stability analysis is capable 
of giving more realistic results in TTC calculations. In addition, the statistical output like 
probability distribution of TTC can provide guidance in power system operation. 
 109
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
 
7.1 Summary 
This dissertation has presented new approaches for power system vulnerability analysis 
considering protection system failures and total transfer capability analysis. The major 
contributions of the work can be summarized as below. 
 
1) New component-protection system models including hidden failure modes and 
mathematical models are established to facilitate power system vulnerability 
analysis considering protection failures. Since protection system failures are the 
main cause of cascading outages and system blackouts result from cascading 
outages, it is important to explore the impact of protection system failures on 
blackouts. The models proposed provide a solid platform for such an analysis. 
Based on these models, adequacy and security analysis can be conducted 
successfully. 
2) Based on the explicit reliability models proposed in this dissertation, a 
comprehensive methodology is developed for power system vulnerability analysis. 
The methodology deals with detailed cascading outage sequences and 
comprehensive system probabilistic features. With the proposed methodology, we 
can not only evaluate common adequacy reliability indices BIP, LOLP, and nEPL, 
but also analyze the transient stability with the occurrence of cascading outages in 
the power system. The reliability results based on different individual faulted lines 
will give us guidelines for the weakest links in a power network. 
3) A new vulnerability index, Integrated System Vulnerability (ISV), is introduced to 
depict the overall severity of the impact of cascading outages. Different reliability 
indices show different weakest links in the system. We could estimate the system 
vulnerable point based on individual reliability index with particular emphasis. In a 
power system, each transmission line has different component failure phenomena, 
protective device hidden failure probability and protection system scheme. Because 
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of these variations, BIP, LOLP, EPL or POS separately might locate different weak 
links for the same system. ISV, with effects of both adequacy and security 
performance, represents the integrated vulnerability of a particular system. 
4) Two innovative Monte Carlo simulation approaches for vulnerability analysis 
considering protection system failures are proposed and developed. One is 
Importance Sampling based Monte Carlo Simulation (IS-MCS) method, which uses 
varied probability to reveal more rare events. Another one is called SOM-IS-MCS, 
which combines Self-Organizing Maps (SOM) and IS-MCS to further reduce the 
simulation time. These two approaches are effective in handling rare event 
simulation problems. 
5) A comprehensive approach for TTC calculation is proposed with consideration of 
thermal, voltage and transient stability limits. Based on this approach, both steady 
state and dynamic security assessments are included in the process of obtaining 
total transfer capability. The studies reported indicate that TTC without considering 
transient stability limits is prone to give optimistic results and could be risky in real 
applications. Based on the proposed approach, the effect of FACTS devices on TTC 
is examined and a new probabilistic TTC methodology is implemented. FACTS 
devices have both positive and negative effects on system stability depending on 
their location. In order to evaluate the effects of FACTS devices on TTC, all critical 
factors need to be taken into account simultaneously. The probability distribution of 
TTC has useful applications in power system operation. Only probabilistic stability 
analysis is capable of giving more realistic results in TTC calculations.  
 
7.2 Suggestions for Further Research 
The work reported in this dissertation can be an important basis for future research 
activities related to power system vulnerability analysis and TTC study. In general, future 
research directions based on this dissertation are summarized below. 
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1) In this dissertation, the security studies only examine the angle transient stability. 
As a matter of fact, power system blackouts are complicated phenomena in which a 
variety of factors are involved. The evaluation of frequency drops following loss of 
a generator, multi-swing loss of synchronism, and voltage dynamics can also be 
investigated for including dynamic effects.  
2) In vulnerability analysis, the power outage duration is not considered in this 
dissertation. Future studies are intended to take account of the outage duration for 
more accurate adequacy analyses. 
3) Dynamic voltage stability has not been considered for TTC analysis in this 
dissertation. Future work need to be done to include voltage stability for a more 
comprehensive analysis scheme. 
4) The WCSS-9 bus system and IEEE RTS-24 have been used to demonstrate the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed methods. To better verify the capability 
of methods for blackout simulation, larger networks need to be tested.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
IEEE-RTS 24 BUS TEST SYSTEM 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.1  24-bus IEEE Reliability Test System Diagram 
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Table A.1 Protection Hidden Failure Data 
Component Protection System 
Line λ 
(1/year) 
µ 
(1/year) 
λp1 
(1/year) 
(x10-2) 
λp2 
(1/year) 
(x10-1) 
µi 
(1/year) 
µI 
(1/hour) 
PZ & PI 
(x10-2) 
1-2 0.24 548 0.86 4.90 4 219 0.19 
1-3 3.41 876 0.19 2.00 4 219 0.04 
1-5 1.53 876 1.57 4.10 4 219 0.36 
2-4 2.09 876 4.08 0.66 4 219 1.00 
2-6 3.08 876 1.18 4.22 4 219 0.27 
3-9 1.98 876 2.94 1.16 4 219 0.71 
3-24 0.02 11.4 4.62 0.37 4 219 1.13 
4-9 1.76 876 1.65 1.66 4 219 0.40 
5-10 1.54 876 1.03 2.88 4 219 0.24 
6-10 0.33 250 1.82 0.68 4 219 0.44 
7-8 1.10 876 4.88 4.34 4 219 1.11 
8-9 2.74 876 3.59 1.65 4 219 0.86 
8-10 2.74 876 3.21 2.44 4 219 0.77 
9-11 0.02 11.4 3.91 2.16 4 219 0.92 
9-12 0.02 11.4 2.33 1.30 4 219 0.56 
10-11 0.02 11.4 1.16 4.92 4 219 0.26 
10-12 0.02 11.4 1.59 4.83 4 219 0.35 
11-13 1.20 796 3.94 4.74 4 219 0.89 
11-14 1.09 796 3.17 2.26 4 219 0.75 
12-13 1.20 796 3.30 1.66 4 219 0.79 
12-23 2.12 796 2.69 0.04 4 219 0.66 
13-23 2.99 796 4.59 0.83 4 219 1.12 
14-16 1.08 796 3.91 4.14 4 219 0.89 
15-16 0.63 796 1.64 3.22 4 219 0.38 
15-21 1.21 796 3.69 1.61 4 219 0.89 
15-21 1.21 796 2.19 0.13 4 219 0.54 
15-24 1.31 796 2.96 1.78 4 219 0.71 
16-17 0.75 796 0.57 3.72 4 219 0.13 
16-19 0.74 796 1.59 1.49 4 219 0.38 
17-18 0.52 796 3.11 0.91 4 219 0.75 
17-22 2.34 796 4.47 2.08 4 219 1.07 
18-21 0.75 796 4.82 4.34 4 219 1.09 
18-21 0.75 796 0.10 3.13 4 219 0.02 
19-20 1.08 796 0.56 0.28 4 219 0.14 
19-20 1.08 796 2.02 2.02 4 219 0.48 
20-23 0.74 796 0.49 1.51 4 219 0.12 
20-23 0.74 796 1.47 0.76 4 219 0.36 
21-22 1.65 796 3.40 1.55 4 219 0.82 
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Table A.2 Important Simulation Parameters 
Fault-clearing time 
normal distribution 
µ = 0.07sec  σ = 0.01sec 
Reclosing time 
normal distribution 
µ = 0.70sec  σ = 0.02sec 
Trip time when  
reclosing fail 
normal distribution 
µ = 0.05sec  σ = 0.01sec 
Backup protection 
operation time 
normal distribution 
µ = 0.50sec  σ = 0.05sec 
Fault duration time 
Rayleigh distribution  
β = 0.35sec  
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
WSCC-9 BUS TEST SYSTEM RELIABILITY DATA 
 
 
Table B.1 Failure Rate and Repair Rate of Each Component 
 Bus no. λ (1/year) 
µ 
(1/year) 
1-4 4 196 
3-6 4 196 Transformer 
8-2 4 196 
4-5 10 193 
5-6 23 193 
6-7 7 193 
7-8 5 193 
8-9 19 193 
Transmission 
Line 
9-4 6 193 
 
 
 
Table B.2 Fault Clearing Time Probability Distribution 
Line Type of distribution Mean time (s) Variance (s) 
4-5 Normal 0.07 0.01 
5-6 Normal 0.07 0.01 
6-7 Normal 0.06 0.01 
7-8 Normal 0.05 0.01 
8-9 Normal 0.04 0.01 
9-4 Normal 0.03 0.01 
 
  
 
Table B.3 Fault Duration Probability Distribution 
Line Type of distribution β 
4-5 Rayleigh 0.29 
5-6 Rayleigh 0.39 
6-7 Rayleigh 0.34 
7-8 Rayleigh 0.28 
8-9 Rayleigh 0.44 
9-4 Rayleigh 0.34 
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Table B.4 Fault Reclosing Time Probability Distribution 
Line Type of distribution Mean time (s) Variance (s) 
4-5 Normal 0.55 0.03 
5-6 Normal 0.75 0.03 
6-7 Normal 0.65 0.03 
7-8 Normal 0.55 0.03 
8-9 Normal 0.85 0.03 
9-4 Normal 0.65 0.03 
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